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Abstract 
International human rights law instruments are not prescriptive regarding the procedure for 
processing refugees by an individual state. However, they do provide an extensive set of 
rights, and it is these rights that form the focus of this study. One of the main principles of 
international law is to protect human rights and human dignity. In the South African context, 
the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’) reinforces section 33 of the 
Constitution, the objective of which is to provide just administrative action for everyone – 
whether they are South African nationals or otherwise. The Department of Home Affairs 
(‘DHA’) is responsible for processing refugee applications under the Refugees Act 130 of 
1998, and as a public body performing a public function it is obliged to adhere to the laws 
prescribed by PAJA. The Refugees Act states in the preamble the intention for the law to give 
effect to the relevant international legal instruments to which South Africa is party and the 
principles and standards relating to refugees contained within. These international 
instruments are the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 197 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. The preamble of the Refugees 
Act also refers to ‘other human rights instruments’ which includes legislation such as the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.  
 It is the recognition of the obligations assumed under the international instruments, 
combined with domestic legislation in PAJA and the Constitution, that provide a stringent set 
of rights designed to give refugees appropriate administrative justice by way of having 
applications processed and decided upon according to the law, including reviews and 
appeals if necessary. As is apparent from many studies and scholarly articles on this topic, 
refugees seeking protection in South Africa are not always treated as the law intended. This 
has a number of different consequences, some of which can pose a danger to life. This 
emphasises the gravity of making the correct legal decision on a refugee application. This 
study will focus on the procedural failings of the DHA, and how these failings often amount 
to insufficient administrative justice and in turn fail to provide refugee applicants with the 
rights to which they are entitled. The study examines this issue from a human rights and 
human dignity perspective – both of which are materially affected by the absence of 
administrative justice rights.   
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Chapter 1 – The importance of administrative justice 
rights 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Refugees Act 130 of 1998 provides for the protection of those fleeing persecution and 
the implementation of international obligations into South African law.
1
 In recent years those 
applying for refugee status in the Republic of South Africa (hereafter the ‘Republic’ or 
‘South Africa’) have faced arduous problems stemming from the Department of Home 
Affairs (‘DHA’).2 These include policy implementation that is restrictive through incorrect 
application according to the law, and includes institutional xenophobia, failure to provide 
accessible services, involves corruption and has a lack of awareness of human rights.
3
  
A report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (‘UNHCR’) in 2016 
listed access to an asylum procedure that is ‘fair and efficient’ as an issue that challenges the 
protection it is intended to offer.
4
 The report cites the limited number of Refugee Reception 
Offices (‘RROs’) as a barrier to processing application efficiently, and threat of closures of 
these offices represents a further threat to capacity issues. The UNHCR report also mentions 
issues surrounding social welfare during pending applications.
5
 This is further criticised by 
Amnesty International in its comments on the proposed asylum processing and administrative 
detention centres on the country’s borders where asylum seekers would be housed while their 
applications are processed. It is argued that this would limit the right to work and freedom of 
movement during the processing period.
6
 
The processing of refugees in South Africa has faced substantial scrutiny. This study will 
narrow the focus down to the procedural aspects of the refugee system in South Africa, 
                                                 
1
 Refugees Act 130 of 1998, preamble at 1. Hereafter the ‘Refugees Act’. 
2
 Janet McKnight, ‘Through the Fear: A Study of Xenophobia in South Africa’s Refugee System’ (2008) 2(2) 
Jounral of Identity and Migration Studies 18-42 at 22. 
3
 Bronwyn Harris (2001) A Foreign Experience: Violence, crime and xenophobia during South Africa’s 
transition at 38-39. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (CSVR), Violence and Transition 
Series, Volume 5. 
4
 UNHCR (August 2016) Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees For the Office of 
the High Commissioner for Human Rights' Compilation Report Universal Periodic Review: 3rd Cycle, 27th 
Session - Republic of South Africa at 5, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5919a9ab4.html> [accessed 
19 May 2017]. 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Amnesty International (2017) Amnesty International Report 2016/17: The state of the world’s human rights at 
311, available at <https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/africa/south-africa/report-south-africa/> [accessed 15 
May 2017]. 
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exploring the access applicants have to the process, including appeals and reviews from an 
administrative justice perspective. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION 
Does the administrative justice system meet international obligations to protect those who 
lawfully need and are entitled to proper protection under refugee laws and regulations, both 
domestic and international? 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The DHA is responsible for the policy implementation regarding refugees. This involves the 
issuing of permits and documentation in order to protect their rights and legalise their 
presence in the country.
7
 In 2016, the Parliamentary Monitoring Group declared that the 
refusal rate for refugee status determination sat at 96 per cent.
8
 Xenophobia is a frequently 
cited problem in South Africa and has been blamed on influencing government policies on 
refugee protection through corrupt practices that lead to restricted, or even barred, access to 
education, public health and other social services to which asylum seekers and refugees are 
entitled to.
9
 Xenophobia has been highlighted by the South African Human Rights 
Commission as ‘a human rights concern’ in the country.10 
A poignant problem faced by asylum seekers is the difficulty in moving on from the 
section 22 ‘temporary asylum permit.’11 This permit is intended to be temporary; however, 
there are ever increasing circumstances whereby this so-called temporary permit is 
continuously extended or renewed, preventing applicants from gaining permanent status. 
Proper process is rarely followed, leading to a lack of administrative justice for applicants. 
The policy and administrative system must improve to meet international obligations to 
protect those who lawfully need and are entitled to proper protection under refugee laws and 
regulations, both domestic and international. 
                                                 
7
 Bronwyn Harris op cit note 3 at 38-39. 
8
 Parliamentary Monitoring Group (8 March 2016) ‘Asylum statistics: Department of Home Affairs briefing; 
Immigration Amendment Bill 2016 deliberations’, available at <https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/22163/> 
[accessed 10 May 2017]. 
9
 Bronwyn Harris op cit note 3 at 113. 
10
 South African Human Rights Commission (7 March 2016) ‘SAHRC raises human rights concerns with 
UNHRC’, available at <https://www.sahrc.org.za/index.php/sahrc-media/news-2/item/367-sahrc-raises-human-
rights-concerns-with-unhrc> [accessed 10 May 2017]. 
11
 Refugees Act, section 22. 
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1.4 SIGNIFICANCE AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this dissertation is to highlight the procedural failings in the refugee system in 
South Africa. The study analyses the ways in which these improper practices are failing to 
meet the country’s obligations under both domestic law and international law, and how the 
resulting barriers to access prevent refugees from enjoying the protection refugee status is 
designed to give. This is not a new topic – much has been written on the issue both scholarly 
and otherwise – yet there continues to be ongoing problems with policy and administration in 
this sector. The study will approach the subject from an administrative justice viewpoint and 
examine procedural compliance with administrative justice provisions and its suitability to 
assist a vulnerable group of people. 
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW 
There are a number of scholarly articles on the issue of refugees in South Africa that 
highlight the processing of refugees and the application of refugee law as a real problem in 
the country. These articles often reach the same conclusions – that there are frequent and 
continuous systemic failing by the DHA.  
Roni Amit examines the quality of 240 status determination decisions issued in 2011 in 
All Roads Lead to Rejection.
12
 The report uses the benchmark of international law and 
domestic refugee law requirements to analyse the constitutional rights to administrative 
justice.
13
 A number of problems are identified; errors of law, references to the wrong 
claimant/country and failure to apply the mind, to name a few.
14
 Concerns are raised over 
asylum seekers rights and for good governance and service delivery,
15
 stating that the DHA 
are prioritising migration control over its protection obligations
16
 and the South African 
government and UNCHR should be alarmed as a result.
17
  
In No Refuge, Amit writes South Africa’s asylum system is being used by economic 
migrants from Africa due to the scarce opportunity for legal economic migration offered by 
South Africa’s immigration framework.18 This has led to the protective nature of the refugee 
                                                 
12
 Roni Amit (2012) All Roads Lead to Rejection: Persistent Bias and Incapacity in South African Refugee 
Status Determination at 8. 
13
 Ibid. at 7. 
14
 Ibid. at 8-9. 
15
 Ibid. at 9. 
16
 Ibid. at 85. 
17
 Ibid. at 86. 
18
 Roni Amit, ‘No refuge: Flawed Status Determination and the Failures of South Africa’s Refugee System to 
Provide Protection’ (2011) 23(3) International Journal of Refugee Law 458-488 at 458. 
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system to become one of control
19
 and placed stress on the system, forcing proper 
consideration to be disregarded.
20
 Some 324 status determination rejections were analysed in 
No Refuge,
21
 with the findings uncovering serious flaws of the same nature mentioned in the 
study above
22
 – reasons were simply cut and paste from other decisions.23 The article blames 
the influence of larger immigration policy for giving rise to a system that violates human 
rights, in particular by failing to adhere to the non-refoulement principle.
24
 
Amit writes another article named Protection and Pragmatism: Addressing 
Administrative Failures in South Africa’s Refugee Status Determination Decisions which 
carries out an analysis of the quality of the status determination decisions, focusing on the 
decision letters from 324 negative decisions
25
 issued at the refugee reception offices at the 
then five permanent refugee reception offices.
26
 Micro and macro level causes are identified 
as influencing said decisions, and it was found that virtually none of the analysed decisions 
contained proper evaluations of the claims.
27
 The refugee status determination officers often 
misapplied the law
28
 and identical reasons for decisions were given.
29
 Amit makes 
recommendations to recognise the refugee system is not an immigration system; that the 
protection purpose of refugee should be the priority, with more training for officers, stronger 
review produces and the need for quality over efficiency in assessing claims.
30
 
Amit also writes about The Zimbabwean Documentation Process (the ‘ZDP’), which was 
carried out between 20 September and 31 December 2010.
31
 This was categorised by the 
DHA as an extension of the one-year special dispensation which ran from April 2009 to April 
2010 and was designed to protect Zimbabweans from deportation by offering a three-month 
visa system.
32
 A number of requirements were relaxed without the applicants’ knowledge, 
which presented an administrative justice problem.
33
 Amit describes the ZDP as very 
                                                 
19
 Ibid. at 460. 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. at 461. 
22
 Ibid. at 456. 
23
 Ibid. at 475. 
24
 Ibid. at 458. 
25
 Roni Amit (2010) Protection and Pragmatism: Addressing Administrative Failures in South Africa’s Refugee 
Status Determination decisions at 8. 
26
 Ibid.  
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. at 39. 
29
 Ibid. at 44. 
30
 Ibid. at 9-15. 
31
 Roni Amit (2011) The Zimbabwean Documentation Process: Lessons Learned at 4. 
32
 Ibid. 
33
 Ibid. at 20. 
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ambitious given the high number of Zimbabweans present in South Africa, as it left the DHA 
offices and officials without sufficient time to follow procedure.
34
 
Erika Feller reinforces the need to distinguish the refugee system from the immigration 
system in her article Refugees are not Migrants. The staunch argument is that the 
differentiation between refugees and migrants is essential 
 
as confusing the two groups is 
detrimental and even dangerous not only to the protection of refugees but also to the benefits 
of migration.
35
 Abuse of the asylum system damages the reputation of migrants in the public 
eye and pushes for arguments of control. The article highlights the difficulties of 
distinguishing between when refugee approaches should be used and when migrant 
approaches should be used.
36
 Feller describes broad use of the class ‘migrant’,37 resulting in 
the perceived absorption of asylum policies into the ‘broader migration control framework.’38  
Elaborating further on the differences between refugees and migrants, Katy Long’s article 
When Refugees Stopped Being Migrants highlights the difficulty of separating the 
classification of refugees and migrants despite the regular insistence of the distinction 
between the two.
39
 It looks at the historical confusion between classing refugees and 
migrants, and cites the 1950s as when definitions of the two groups started to become more 
prominent.
40
 During this time refugees were given ‘an exceptional right’ to claim asylum 
which greatly helped bridge the protection gap.
41
 The article goes on to explain that whilst 
protection for refugees is necessary, it can create more harm than good in denying ‘economic 
livelihood’42 and the level of separation should actually be reversed as asylum by itself is not 
sustainable.
43
 Long argues that protection should be accompanied by ‘sustainable 
livelihoods’44 in order to further justify people’s escape from persecution in areas of conflict 
and crisis, and thus offer a better all-round solution. 
With focus on South Africa and the problems faced by the country’s internal processing 
procedures, Fatima Khan’s book Refugee Law in South Africa has several chapters which are 
                                                 
34
 Ibid. at 7. 
35
 Erika Feller, ‘Refugees are not Migrants’ (2005) 24(1) Refugee Survey Quarterly 27-35 at 27. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Katy Long, ‘When refugees stopped bring migrants: Movement, labour and humanitarian protection’ (2013) 
1(1) Migration Studies 4-26 at 4. 
40
 Ibid. at 4-5. 
41
 Ibid. at 4. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid. 
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of particular significance to the study and cover the difficulty facing applicants in terms of 
the regulations requiring applications to be submitted at designated RROs.
45
 This restricts 
access and delays applications, therefore working against the applicant.
46
 In addition, refugee 
reception officers are regularly found to carrying out their duties incorrectly and in some 
cases the DHA even deliberately bars access.
47
 
Asylum seekers and refugees are regularly subject to unfair procedure and policies that 
make it difficult for them to find legal protection
48
 and representation.
49
 The Constitution 
gives asylum seekers and refugees the right to administrative justice that is lawful, reasonable 
and fair. In addition to the Constitution, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 
2000 (PAJA) gives effect to constitutional rights to such justice, and aims to create an 
environment of increased accountability for decision makers.
50
 This combination of 
constitutional and statutory rights brings the legislation in line with the 1951 Refugee 
Convention,
51
 effectively leading to an obligation for South Africa to offer sufficient civil and 
political rights.
52
 The effective use of the mechanisms in place should allow the refugee 
appropriate administrative and legal access the rights they are entitled to.
53
 
These rights provide for important safe-guarding measures, as intended by the South 
African Constitution and international human rights and refugee laws. However, refugee 
status determinations (hereafter ‘RSD’ or ‘RSDs’) are often found to contain errors of law 
that cite irrelevant factors, frequent failure to give adequate reasons or blatant ignorance of 
individual cases which combines to form a ‘biased incentive system that encourages the 
issuing of rejections.’54 The policy of RSDs as a matter of humanitarian action or influx 
control and its administrative and constitutional legality is analysed extensively by Khan.
55
 
1.6 METHODOLOGY 
The methodology in this paper will be desktop-based research and analysis of the law and 
relevant cases. Quantitative research will not be a part of this study. The research will be 
                                                 
45
 William Kerfoot and Tal Schreier ‘Application for asylum: Reception’ in Fatima Khan and Tal Schreier (eds) 
Refugee Law in South Africa (2014) 137-152 at 137. 
46
 Ibid. at 139. 
47
 Ibid. at 158. 
48
 Ibid. at 208. 
49
 Ibid. at 151. 
50
 Ibid. at 209. 
51
 Ibid. at 205. 
52
 Ibid at 204-6. 
53
 Ibid. at 208. 
54
 Ibid. at 154. 
55
 Ibid. 
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centred on analysis of the legal instruments in place for South Africa’s refugee law, the 
applicable international laws, and will use scholarly articles, case law and case studies. This 
will allow for detailed study into the way the law is applied, the process in which refugees 
must go through and any critical analysis dependent on the findings. 
1.7 RESEARCH AIMS 
The predominant aims of the research are to investigate the problem the South Africa has in 
processing refugee applications. The research will aim to highlight both the international 
obligations on the country regarding accepting refugee applications – such as the right to 
administrative justice which is invoked by various failings in policy implementation, time 
limits on temporary permits and ensuing delays, lack of access to appeal bodies and access to 
the process in general through scarce and exclusive RROs and other errors in law that deny 
these rights.  
Using case law, scholarly articles and other literature by NGOs and other organisations, 
the aim will be to identify the problem and summarise where the law is misapplied and 
procedure is not being followed. The research will aim to provide an approach from a human 
rights and human dignity perspective through the assessment of international law, most 
notably the 1951 Refugee Convention and the obligations this imposes on states party to it. 
1.8 OVERVIEW OF THE LAW 
The 1951 Refugee Convention, along with other bodies of international law, is completely 
silent on procedure for the recognition of refugee status by a state or the UNHCR. However, 
what international law does provide for are rights
56
 – and the predominant difference between 
affording and denying these rights, particularly in South Africa, is the right to administrative 
justice. Despite the silence in statute, the UNHCR has produced a Handbook that provides 
guidance on procedures and criteria for determining refugee status and what can be done in 
the absence of international law. This Handbook has been deemed to be soft law through its 
acceptance in case law, which has demonstrated its strength and usefulness in providing 
guidance on procedure.
57
 
                                                 
56
 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 UNTS 150, adopted on 25 July 1951 in 
Geneva and entered into force on 22 April 1954. Hereafter the ‘1951 Refugee Convention’. 
57
 UNHCR, Handbook and Guidelines on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, December 
2011, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 3. Hereafter the ‘UNHCR Handbook’. 
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The right to administrative justice is reflected in all forms of international law,
58
 as well 
as the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (hereafter the ‘Constitution’) and the 
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (‘PAJA’). The purpose of PAJA is to 
‘give effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair’ in line with sections 33(1) and (2) of the Constitution.59 Both the Constitution and PAJA 
form part of the argument for the injustices faced by refugee applicants in South Africa. 
The law surrounding refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa is governed by the 
Refugees Act 130 of 1998 (hereafter the ‘Refugees Act’). The purpose of the Act is to: 
[G]ive effect within the Republic of South Africa to the relevant international legal 
instruments, principles and standards relating to refugees; to provide for the reception into 
South Africa of asylum seekers; to regulate applications for and recognition of refugee status; 
to provide for the rights and obligations flowing from such status; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith.
60
 
The preamble of the Refugees Act refers to the various international legislation the 
country has acceded to, namely the 1951 Convention Relating to Status of Refugees 
(hereafter ‘1951 Refugee Convention’); the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(hereafter ‘1967 Protocol’);61 and the 1969 Organization of African Unity Convention 
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (hereafter ‘1969 OAU 
Convention’).62 The preamble further mentions ‘other human rights instruments’ and thus 
demonstrates its desire to cover human rights broadly.
63
 It is these mechanisms that the Act 
seeks to give effect to, and it is therefore intended to adhere to these obligations and enable 
South Africa to ‘treat in its territory refugees in accordance with the standards and principles 
established in international law.’64 
The principle of non-refoulement – a fundamental principle of international law that has 
been defined by a number of international legal instruments
65
 – is contained in section 2 of 
                                                 
58
 Daven Dass, Jonathan Klaaren, Kaajal Ramjathan-Keogh and Fatima Khan ‘The civil and political rights of 
refugees and asylum seekers in South Africa’ in Fatima Khan and Tal Schreier (eds) Refugee Law in South 
Africa (2014) 203-219 at 210. 
59
 Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, preamble. Hereafter ‘PAJA’. 
60
 Refugees Act, preamble at 2.  
61
 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 UNTS 267, adopted on 31 January 1967 and 
entered into force on 22 April 1954. Hereafter the ‘1967 Protocol’. 
62
 Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in 
Africa, 1001 UNTS 45, adopted on 10 September 1969 and entered into force on 20 June 1974. Hereafter the 
‘1969 OAU Convention’. 
63
 Ibid. 
64
 Ibid. 
65
 UNHCR ‘Note on Non-Refoulement (Submitted by the High Commissioner) EC/SCP/2’, available at 
<http://www.unhcr.org/afr/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-non-refoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html> 
[accessed 31 May 2017]. 
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the Act. Under this principle, no person can be refused entry or be returned ‘in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion.’66 No reservations to this Article are permitted, which is ‘hailed as a cornerstone of 
refugee law by the UNHCR and academics.’67 It is explicitly designed to protect the life of 
anyone falling under the definition of a refugee as provided by the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.
68
 
This is well covered in the Refugee Act, which makes the principle of non-refoulement 
absolute in the use of its wording: 
[N]otwithstanding any provision of this Act or any other law to the contrary, no person may 
be refused entry into the Republic, expelled, extradited or returned to any other country or be 
subject to any similar measure, if as a result of such refusal, expulsion, extradition, return or 
other measure, such person is compelled to return to or remain in a country where- 
(a) he or she may be subjected to persecution on account of his or her race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group; or 
(b) his or her life, physical safety or freedom would be threatened on account of external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or other events seriously disturbing or 
disrupting public order in either part or the whole of that country.
69 
 The qualification criteria for refugees are provided for in section 3, citing the need for ‘a 
well-founded fear’ of being persecuted due to a person’s ‘race, tribe, religion, nationality, 
political opinion or membership of a particular social group.’70 Section 3(b) provides a 
definition of a refugee, expanding the definition set out the 1969 OAU Convention.
71
 
In opposition to section 3, the exclusions from qualifying for refugee status are laid out in 
section 4(1), which refers particularly to omissions due to a person committing criminal 
acts;
72
 however section 4(d) notably disqualifies a person who is protected by another country 
in which they have taken residence – this is South Africa’s ‘first country of asylum’ policy.73 
                                                 
66
 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, Article 33(1). 
67
 Fatima Khan ‘The principle of non-refoulement’ in Fatima Khan and Tal Schreier (eds) Refugee Law in South 
Africa (2014) 3-19 at 3-4. 
68
 UNHCR Handbook op cit note 57 para 28. 
69
 Refugee Act, section 2. The wording includes ‘notwithstanding any provision of this Act or any other law to 
the contrary.’ 
70
 Ibid., section 3(a). 
71
 1969 OAU Convention, Article 1. 
72
 Refugees Act, section 4(1)(a), (b) and (c). Subsection (a) provides for crimes against humanity, including 
those against peace or war crimes, and subsection (b) relates to crimes that would be punishable by 
imprisonment if they were committed in South Africa. 
73
 Ibid., section 4(d). 
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There are a number of ways in which the protections offered to refugees can legally cease 
to exist. These ways include voluntarily surrendering any protections offered by their home 
country; reacquiring original nationality either voluntarily or formally; acquiring a new 
nationality and the protections offered therein; and if the circumstances that caused an 
applicant to flee change and the threat posed is no longer genuine.
74
 
The Act’s conformity with international law is included in section 6. The following 
international obligations are noted: the 1951 Refugee Convention; the 1967 Protocol; the 
1969 OAU Convention; and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948.
75
 
Refugee Reception Offices are covered by section 8 of the Act, with the responsibility for 
for establishing these lying with the Director-General. There is no limit as to the number of 
RROs that can be set-up;
76
 however they are required to have at least one Refugee Status 
Determination Officer (‘RSDO’) who must ‘have such qualifications, experience and 
knowledge of refugee matters as makes them capable of performing their functions.’77 
The process for applying for asylum begins in section 21 of the Act. The primary 
requirement for application is that it is made in person at a RRO, and it imposes obligations 
on the officer tending to the application to ensure that the application is completed properly 
and to provide assistance wherever necessary.
78
 Upon submission of an application, an 
applicant should be issued with an asylum permit which is temporary in nature and allows the 
applicant to reside in South Africa for the prescribed period.  
The Refugee Regulations (Forms and Procedures) 2000 (hereafter the ‘Refugee 
Regulations’) states the time period that any asylum seeker should have such a temporary 
status is 180 days.
79
 The intention of the drafters is clear; this is not a status that should 
continue in perpetuity. This thesis will address the recourse the applicant has in terms of 
administrative law. 
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1.9 CHAPTER SYNOPSIS 
The first chapter contains the proposal, an introduction to the paper in general, including the 
title, methodology, problem statement, a brief literature review and an overview of the law to 
be studied in the research.  
Chapter two focuses on asylum seekers and their rights, particularly the temporary 
asylum status compared against refugee status and the difficulty facing applicants in 
obtaining full refugee status. The term ‘asylum seeker’ is not mentioned in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention – it is a term adopted by states. This chapter studies the history of the term and 
why states use it, along with prejudices that the term can bring. 
The third chapter looks at the applicable law relating to the processing of refugees claims. 
The right to reasonable administrative justice under international law is discussed in line with 
the processing of refugee claims under the procedure outlined by the Refugees Act. These 
rights will be studied alongside case law and the application of PAJA and the Constitution in 
order to determine the extent of South Africa’s legal obligations during the refugee status 
determination process.  
Chapter four focuses on the suitability of administrative law in situations where status 
determinations are likely to take a long time. It will address the question of whether a 
vulnerable class of people such as refugees can effectively benefit from administrative 
justice. 
Chapter five focuses on the South African problem. Using the examples and studies 
mentioned in the literature review to centre the discussion on what went wrong and what 
continues to go wrong in South Africa, the chapter will analyse why the system of processing 
refugees is not achieving what the law provides for. This analysis will demonstrate the 
procedural difficulties facing applicants, and will discuss whether appropriate and reasonable 
administrative rights are being provided to those seeking to obtain refugee status. 
Finally, chapter six of this paper concludes the research findings and practically applies 
the analysis with the current situation facing refugee applicants in South Africa. This chapter 
will also make recommendations as to how South Africa could make administrative justice 
more effective through increasing the capacity of RROs, better training of RSDOs and a 
closer working partnership with the UNHCR in order to offer sufficient protection. 
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Chapter 2 – Asylum seekers: rights and temporary status 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees defines an asylum seeker 
as ‘someone whose request for sanctuary has yet to be processed.’80 However, this is not a 
legal definition and despite this recognition by the UNHCR, the term ‘asylum-seeker’ is not 
mentioned in the 1951 Refugee Convention or the 1967 Protocol. The international 
legislation merely defines a person’s right to seek asylum, rather than labelling those persons 
as so.
81
 The term has been adopted by states and is attributed to those whose claims for 
refugee status are yet to been fully processed or decided.  
The 1951 Refugee Convention defines a refugee in Article 1A firstly by referring to 
preceding legislation and any previous decisions thereunder still applying,
82
 and then 
secondly by providing its own definition: 
[A]s a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of 
being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
83
 
The UNHCR Handbook reinforces the definition provided in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention. Paragraph 28 provides potential guidance on how asylum seekers should be 
treated by stating that a person can become a refugee under the legislation before any formal 
determination is made on their status. A status determination ‘does not therefore make him a 
refugee but declares him to be one.’84 This effectively means that an asylum seeker, as 
viewed by any prospective receiving states, could legally be a refugee before the receiving 
State has made any relevant internal determinations.  
Consider then the potential for prejudice when a State does not afford a person the full 
range of rights they might be legally entitled to. This could be during the application process 
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in the ‘asylum’ phase, or in failing to declare such a person to be a refugee either by refusing 
an application or allowing the asylum label to carry on in perpetuity. If the formal decision 
making process does not determine a person to be a refugee, but fulfils the criteria in the 
definition provided by the 1951 Refugee Convention, then the question arises as to why a 
person is denied recognition as a refugee despite legally being so.  
The term ‘asylum seeker’ is described by Zetter as a label that is used as a form of 
temporary protection that has ‘no basis in international law’85 despite its usage around the 
world. Zetter argues the purpose of this label is to act as a precursor to refugee status in order 
to ‘deter putative refugees and other migrants, to severely restrict access for those who made 
it to their borders, and relentlessly to curtail the rights and assistance afforded those who 
managed to gain entry.’86 
In South Africa, the DHA defines an asylum seeker as ‘a person who has fled his or her 
country of origin and is seeking recognition and protection as a refugee in the Republic of 
South Africa, and whose application is still under consideration.’87 The Refugees Act defines 
an asylum seeker as ‘a person who is seeking recognition as a refugee in the Republic.’88 
The roots of the term can be traced to post-war Europe, whereby developments in policy 
tended to mirror one another in such a way as to restrict or limit the number of asylum 
applications.
89
 Essentially, the creation, use and application of the term has made becoming a 
refugee significantly harder by pushing asylum claims ‘further back into the process of 
migration’90 and thus reducing opportunities applicants have to achieve refugee status. In 
addition to this, the rights of refugees and those of asylum seekers are inherently different – 
this supports the notion that the term is a tool used by states to restrict and avoid accepting 
refugees. The use of the term asylum seeker is not in line with the purpose of the 1951 
Refugee Convention which is protection-orientated. It is clear that the term was introduced 
into refugee law to exclude and restrict people from applying for asylum. 
This chapter will provide an overview of the term, including its historical background, 
how it is legally different from a refugee and where such branding of those seeking protection 
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from persecution are hindered by its usage both in a legal and social context which specific 
demonstration of the problem in South Africa. 
2.2 HISTORY OF THE TERM 
The emergence of this new label is attributed to legislative formations in Europe in the late 
1980s to mid-1990s. European countries formed extensive frameworks of immigration 
policies as a way of responding to ‘a threatening rise in migration which extant domestic 
policies and procedures had failed to stem.’91 This European response was then reflected 
across the world – legislative instruments were enacted that ultimately transformed the 
meaning of a refugee under the 1951 Refugee Convention.
92
  Indeed, a desire to alter the 
meaning is demonstrated in the process of this transformation where there were calls to revise 
the 1951 Refugee Convention definition as it was deemed to no longer be appropriate nor 
applicable in light of the European change.
93
 
2.2.1 Developments of asylum policy in Europe 
A key instrument of asylum policy in Europe is the 1951 Refugee Convention and singles out 
Article 1 (providing for the definition of a refugee) and Article 33 (the principle of non-
refoulement) as two important aspects in relation to European policy.
94
  
Whilst it is the 1951 Refugee Convention that lays the foundations for asylum policy, a 
change in circumstances led to a change in the trajectory of intentions. The lack of any 
detailed ruling on dealing with mass influxes of those seeking asylum enabled receiving 
states to take measures to deter.
95
 In identifying a pattern in these changes, Hatton looks at 
policy pre-1999 which largely saw development occur at State level, the period from 1999-
2004 which saw policy efforts focus on an EU-wide policy, and a then future period (at the 
time Hatton’s article was written) of 2004-2010. 
The pre-1999 period saw the introduction of restrictive policy on a broad scale, which 
reformed application assessments and changed the way in which applicants were treated 
during the processing period. The 1990 Dublin Convention and a ministerial meeting in 
London in 1992 saw several key recommendations made. The first was the ‘safe third 
country’ allowing a State to refuse an application if the applicant had travelled through a 
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country that was deemed to be ‘safe’ – the idea is that an application should be submitted in 
this country.
96
 Secondly, any ‘manifestly unfounded’ claims were allowed to be rejected 
without any right to appeal. Thirdly, a list of safe countries was put together whereby states 
could make the presumption that there was no risk of persecution and thus fast-track any 
claims by applicants from the listed countries.
97
 These were just recommendations and not 
binding law, however a gradual spread was seen across Europe with most European Union 
(EU) nations implementing them in some shape or form between 1991 and 1998.
98
 
Another change of note was the rights of asylum seekers during the application process. 
Rights to work were restricted, as were access to welfare benefits and detention rules.
99
 Such 
changes are described by Hatton as ‘a race to the bottom’100 insomuch as receiving states 
wanted to be at the bottom of the list in terms of numbers of asylum seekers received. This 
involved deflection tactics whereby EU governments, in the absence of any binding, 
harmonised policy, could act individually in a way that protected themselves ‘against floods 
of asylum seekers by tightening access, toughening their procedures and affording less 
generous treatment to asylum seekers, thus deflecting them elsewhere.’101 Restricting asylum 
seeker rights was a way of reducing intake. 
Germany proposed a system to the European Council (EC) in 1994 involving 
redistribution of asylum seekers within the EU using a formula calculated on population, size 
of country and GDP per capita, however this was rejected by a number of states who were, at 
the time, receiving far fewer asylum applications than Germany.
102
 Instead the EC proposed 
two resolutions in 1995 asking countries to protection asylum applicants ‘in a spirit of 
solidarity.’103 It could be argued this reflects an overall aim of international law today, 
particularly the 1951 Refugee Convention and the ‘no reservation rule’ for Articles 2 to 34. 
However, these resolutions were never invoked and it wasn’t until the 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam that the EU began developing harmonised policies.
104
  
This harmonisation saw immigration and asylum policy moved from the Third Pillar 
(covering inter-governmental agreements relating to justice and other issues) to the First 
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Pillar, putting it in the same bracket as free movement of goods, services and persons – an 
area in which the EU could make binding regulations.
105
 A European Council meeting in 
Tampere, Finland, in 1999 discussed the implementation of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
and a unified status for those granted refugee status known as a ‘Common European Asylum 
System’106 which reaffirmed the importance of ‘absolute respect of the right to seek asylum’ 
which was taken to mean that ‘asylum and access to asylum can never be subordinated to 
control measures.’107 
2.2.2 Development of asylum policy in Africa 
A similar change was seen in Africa from the mid-1980s, which was the period in which 
African nations began retreating from the fundamental principles of international refugee 
law.
108
 Before this shift Africa had a liberal policy described by Rutinwa as the ‘golden age’ 
of asylum in Africa which was largely attributed to the 1951 Refugee Convention and other 
human rights law mechanisms.
109
 The shift saw refugees begin to be contained in their 
countries of origin, the principle of non-refoulement started to be ignored, and basics rights 
were not afforded. Examples of this include refusing entry or expelling refugees back to their 
country of origin before their case had been adequately investigated.
110
 
From the 1990s onwards, the basic rights of refugees were declining significantly, 
particularly with regards to their physical protection within the host country and right to 
human dignity and self-sufficiency. Examples include Rwandan refugees in the DRC (known 
as Zaire at the time) and the large-scale refugee camps which are often over-populated, 
poorly maintained, and prevent the inhabitants from integrating into local society.
111
 Rutinwa 
aptly quotes human rights author Bill Frelick with regard to the refugee crisis in the Great 
Lakes, where refugees from Rwanda fled to Tanzania, that ‘to use the word ‘asylum’ to 
describe the situation of [these refugees] is to bastardize the word. What we saw here was 
something else – “pseudo-asylum”.’112 
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The reasons for such changes in Africa are attributed to a number of factors: the sheer 
size of the refugee problem; the effect of large refugee influxes on host communities; 
concerns over the economy and security; and other external reliance factors such as 
international support.
113
 
However, mass influx situations do not provide an excuse for incorrect application of 
international refugee law. There are circumstances where prima facie recognition occurs, 
which involves determining refugee status for entire groups. The application of such 
recognition is given guidance by paragraph 44 of the UNHCR Handbook and is done in 
situations where assistance is urgently required and therefore individual determination is 
simply not practical.
114
 This form of recognition ‘raises a presumption that individual 
members of the group are refugees’115 and therefore can benefit from the relevant 
international protection until such time as it is established that they are indeed not, or are no 
longer.
116
 The approach has been used worldwide and specifically in Africa before and after 
the existence of the 1969 OAU Convention. 
Tanzania applied this approach for Rwandan nationals, whereby asylum seekers were pre-
screened and registered at a reception centre and then appear before a National Eligibility 
Committee at a later date, where evidence is sought relating to claims for refugee status.
117
 
Guinea also implemented prima facie recognition in 1998 when the country experienced an 
influx of refugees from Sierra Leone. In this instance, the refugees passed freely across the 
border and were registered once inside Guinea. Lists of the groups granted prima facie 
recognition were passed to the UNHCR for registration. This example was also used in 
Liberia.
118
 
 In 1991, Kenya saw the arrival of a vast number of refugees from Somalia and Sudan. 
Kenya used an individual assessment system, which became impossible due to the scale of 
the influx and the responsibility for status determination was passed to the UNHCR who 
granted recognition of refugee status on a prima facie basis.
119
 In another instance whereby 
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the UNHCR was called upon, the Gambia enlisted the UN body who gave prima facie status 
to refugees coming from Sierra Leone and the Casamance region of Senegal.
120
 
2.2.3 Development of asylum policy in South Africa 
During the apartheid era, the South African government refused to develop any sort of 
refugee policy and in doing so rejected the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1969 OAU 
Convention. The National Party policy saw asylum seekers as ‘illegal aliens’ under the Aliens 
Control Act of 1991 (‘ACA’),121 with heavy penalties imposed on those seeking to enter the 
Republic illegally and powers of entry, search and arrest were given to both the police and 
immigration officers.
122
  
The post-apartheid government became signatories to the conventions in 1995, and the 
emergence of the Refugee Act is described as a ‘landmark event’ by Crush and McDonald, as 
the ACA was ‘never intended to offer protection to anyone.’123 Despite this, the same authors 
argue the country still does not provide an effective refugee determination system as it carries 
a ‘strong residual suspicion…that most asylum seekers are economic migrants in 
masquerade.’124 
 South Africa is regrettably no exception to the trend set by European countries. It has 
included the term asylum seeker in its legislation, which is included in section 1 of the 
Refugees Act and defined as ‘a person who is seeking recognition as a refugee in the 
Republic.’125 South Africa did not follow the lead of other countries in Africa that employed 
a prima facie mechanism for receiving refugees.  
 The examples of prima facie status recognition discussed above demonstrate times when 
countries in Africa have been compelled to move from an individual assessment system to a 
group-based status determination system. Whilst section 35 of the Refugees Act provides for 
the reception and accommodation of asylum seekers in the event of a mass influx,
126
 the 
DHA does not apply a form of prima facie status determination. Scholarly research has 
attributed this to a lack of understanding in the DHA as to what ‘prima facie refugees’ mean 
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and what constitutes a mass influx situation.
127
 Shreier writes that this demonstrates a ‘clear 
inconsistency that exists in terms of the legislative intent of the Refugees Act as compared to 
the actual understanding and practice’128 of DHA officials in the RROs. The DHA has 
claimed instances of mass influxes yet never implemented special power provisions under 
section 35 of the Refugees Act, which would allow the accommodation of specific categories 
or groups of refugees.
129
 
 The approach of the DHA in determining refugee status appears to utilise the 1969 OAU 
Convention’s definition of a refugee to employ a unique method of prima facie refugee 
determination for individuals as opposed to groups of people during mass influx or 
emergency situations.
130
 The South African approach bases status determination on whether 
or not it is ‘obvious’ according to the conditions of the applicant’s country of origin.131 
 The South African version of prima facie status determination includes practices that are 
unofficial or non-legislated such a pre-screening processes, white-listing of countries 
producing refugees and a focus on the nationality of an asylum seeker.
132
 Tuepker describes 
the DHA as having an ‘institutional culture that overwhelmingly supports an automatic link 
between nationality and refugeehood which produces the shared knowledge that asylum is 
only “really” for a select group of nationals.’133 This results in a harsh interpretation of the 
term ‘asylum seeker’ and the definitions provided in international legislation as it narrows the 
acceptance of refugee applications based on the nationality of the applicant. 
2.3 CURRENT TREND 
The use of labels has been heavily influenced by the media. An example is the excessive use 
of the term ‘migrant’ in media report concerning asylum seekers, which Alexander Betts 
describes as a word that ‘says nothing about their entitlement to cross that border or whether 
they should be.’134 It has become a word that does not reflect the needs of refugees – it 
implies voluntary movement instead of forced movement, and such words ‘that convey an 
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exaggerated sense of threat can fuel anti-immigration sentiment and a climate of intolerance 
and xenophobia’135 according to Betts, who is the director of the Refugee Studies Centre at 
Oxford University. 
Separating refugee from migrants is important.
136
 The term is also increasingly being 
used in a pejorative sense
137
 and has ‘evolved from its dictionary definitions into a tool that 
dehumanises and distances’138 those who are legally entitled to protection. This is supported 
by Feller, who is the former Assistant High Commissioner for Protection at UNHCR and 
wrote in 2005 that ‘refugees are not migrants…it is dangerous and detrimental to refugee 
protection, to confuse the two groups, terminologically or otherwise.’139 This statement was 
made in response to claims that refugees should first be treated as migrants upon reception – 
which is the reason for the term ‘asylum seeker’ emerging. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
Until the move away from the apartheid era the policy was outright rejection sympathetic 
refugee policy under the ACA. Asylum policy in South Africa has a relatively young history 
due to the recent acceptance of the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1969 OAU Convention. 
This is a stark contrast to the developments of asylum policies in Europe and other African 
countries, which have effectively moved from more liberal systems to gradual tightening. 
 It is important to separate refugees and migrants. Confusing the two creates danger for 
refugees and goes against the intentions of the 1951 Refugee Convention. Use of the word 
‘migrant’ by the media when referring to asylum seekers creates a negative perception. The 
term does not feature in international legislation – it is a term that has emerged from the 
practice of states to categorise those whose applications for refugee status are not yet 
processed. 
South African asylum and refugee policy has been criticised as remaining ineffective and 
offering little protection despite the adoption of the international laws in 1995. The country 
                                                 
135
 Adam Taylor for The Washington Post (24 August 2015) ‘Is it time to ditch the word ‘migrant’?’, available 
at <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/08/24/is-it-time-to-ditch-the-word-
migrant/?utm_term=.6ab269317ad1> [21 March 2018]. 
136
 K Long op cit note 39 at 4. 
137
 Ibid. 
138
 Barry Malone for Al Jazeera News (20 August 2015) ‘Why Al Jazeera will not say Mediterranean 
‘migrants’’, available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/blogs/editors-blog/2015/08/al-jazeera-mediterranean-
migrants-150820082226309.html> [accessed 22 March 2018]. The article discusses the widespread use of the 
term ‘migrant’ in coverage of the refugee situation in Europe. It highlights the detrimental effects of confusing 
refugees and migrants, and is a useful account from a media editor as to why confusing the terms is a problem. 
139
 E Feller, ‘Refugees are not Migrants’ (2005) 24 (4) Refugee Survey Quarterly 27–35 at 27. 
  
21 
 
has employed a version of prima facie recognition that is inconsistent with its definition. This 
has been attributed to a lack of understanding within the DHA as to what prima facie 
refugees are and what is perceived as a mass influx situation. There is an inconsistency 
between the intentions of the Refugees Act and the DHA’s implementation and practice. 
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Chapter 3 – Establishing the normative framework 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter has outlined the prejudices suffered by refugees as a result of the 
unfortunate classification of refugees as asylum seekers whilst their status is being 
determined by the host state. The 1951 Refugee Convention does not mention the term 
‘asylum seeker’ or the phase before because a refugee is granted asylum. This may well be 
because the drafters did not foresee this phase to be as drawn out as it is currently 
experienced by refugees. There is however very little in the Convention that can assist the 
asylum seeker with a swift status determination because it is completely silent on the 
procedures of granting asylum – it is not dealt with by the 1951 Refugee Convention.140  
This chapter will therefore critically analyse the administrative justice offered by the 
Convention to see whether it is able to assist the refugee who is denied rights as a result of a 
lack of procedural safeguards within it. Although silent on procedure, international law is 
quite the opposite when it comes to rights. Various rights are outlined in the 1951 Refugee 
Convention, including the right to administrative assistance (Article 25) and the right to 
access the courts (Article 16). Administrative justice rights are also contained in the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 14)
141
 and the 1986 African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Article 7)
142
 – of which the latter provides broader 
rights as follows: 
1. Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This comprises: 
a. the right to an appeal to competent national organs against acts of violating his 
fundamental rights as recognized and guaranteed by conventions, laws, 
regulations and customs in force; 
b. the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty by a competent court or 
tribunal; 
c. the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice; 
d. the right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial court or tribunal.143   
Additionally, the UNHCR has produced a Handbook providing guidance on procedures 
and criteria for determining refugee status, which focuses of the 1951 Refugee Convention 
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and 1967 Protocol as the ‘two instruments of universal scope.’144 The Handbook has taken a 
role as soft law, with its use in case law giving it substantial strength in providing for 
guidance and procedure relating to the determination of refugee status.
145
 Its intention is to 
‘guide government officials, judges, practitioners, as well as UNHCR staff applying the 
refugee definition.’146 Guidelines on the procedural process for determining refugee status are 
provided in part two of the Handbook, listing ‘certain basic requirements’147 that are to be 
met when considering an asylum application. One such requirement is that an applicant who 
is not recognised as a refugee should ‘be given a reasonable time to appeal for a formal 
reconsideration of the decision, either to the same or to a different authority, whether 
administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system.’148 
With regard to domestic law, the Refugees Act is designed to ‘provide for reception into 
South Africa of asylum seekers’ and to regulate applications for refugee status.149 The Act 
intends to give effect to ‘the relevant international legal instruments, principles and standards 
relating to refugees’ and mentions specifically the 1951 Refugee Convention, 1967 Protocol 
and 1969 OAU Convention in its preamble.
150
 It is the Refugees Act that oversees the 
processing of refugee claims.  
In addition, section 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides a 
‘right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and fair.’151 It also gives the right to 
those who have been adversely affected by administrative action to be given written reasons 
for the action taken. Section 33(3) says ‘national legislation must be enacted to give effect to 
these rights’152 by providing for reviews of any administrative actions through courts or 
tribunals.
153
 It also imposes a duty on the State to ‘promote an efficient administration.’154 
The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (hereafter known as ‘PAJA’) is the 
legislation that enforces section 33 constitutional rights, with its aim to: 
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[G]ive effect to the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair and to the right written reasons for administrative action as contemplated in section 33 of 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996; and to provide for matters incidental 
thereto.
155
 
The intended effect of PAJA is particularly pertinent to this study. An overview of the 
legislation from international law downwards to domestic instruments suggests conformity 
with international law and the Constitution. However, through analysis of case law and the 
problems identified in the literature review above, it is possible to identify ways in which the 
refugee status determination procedure under the Refugees Act is not fully affording the 
rights provided the law to refugee applicants in South Africa. 
This chapter will provide the normative framework for providing refugee status in terms 
of international law as well as South African domestic law, identifying the gaps as well as 
critiquing the feasibility of a highly regulated asylum system such as the South African 
system.  
3.2 THE PROCEDURE FOR SEEKING ASYLUM IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Upon entry to the Republic, a person wishing to claim asylum reports to the government 
authority at a port of entry is issued with a temporary ‘asylum seeker permit’ under section 23 
of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002.
156
 This permit is valid for 14 days and allows the 
applicant to report to the nearest RRO in order to lodge their application.
157
 Here the 
applicant’s fingerprints are taken, an interview with a RO is carried out, data and imagery are 
recorded on the refugee system, and a section 22 permit is issued in terms of the Refugees 
Act.
158
 
A second interview is then carried out by a Refugee Status Determination Officer 
(RSDO). It is the responsibility of the RSDO to make a decision on the application, and it 
must be done in a manner that is fair – this includes providing reasons for the decision. In 
deciding, a RSDO must either grant asylum and therefore refugee status, or reject the 
application on grounds that the application is ‘manifestly unfounded, abusive or fraudulent; 
or refer any question of law to the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs.’159 Where an 
application is rejected as unfounded, an applicant can lodge an appeal to the Refugee Appeal 
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Board (hereafter the ‘Appeal Board’) within 30 days of the decision of the application being 
communicated to them. The entire status determination process should take place within 180 
days.
160
 
 This is not the case in reality. Whilst Amit writes that ‘a properly functioning status 
determination system is characterised by an administratively fair procedure’161 with which 
the integrity of such a system relies upon, the reality is that the system is under-resourced 
with insufficiently trained RSDOs and review procedures that focus solely on checking 
positive decisions in the interests of preventing corruption.
162
 All this has the effect of 
forming a flawed process that moves it away from sufficient administrative effectiveness and 
justice, as well as the fundamental aim of the refugee framework to protect those that need 
it.
163
   
3.3 ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL AND SOUTH 
AFRICAN LAW 
The right to administrative justice is enshrined in a number of legal mechanisms. Firstly, 
there is international law, which is interpreted into domestic law in South Africa through 
section 33 of the Constitution and then subsequently given effect by PAJA.  
3.3.1 International law 
Article 14 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’) provides the right 
for everyone to ‘seek and enjoy asylum in other countries asylum from persecution.’164 The 
introductory note of the 1951 Refugee Convention states its consolidation of previous 
international instruments relating to refugees and ‘provides the most comprehensive 
codification of the rights of refugees at the international level.’165 
The importance of international law is emphasised in the Dorcasse judgment. Moshidi J 
quotes Professor John Dugard in International Law – A South African Perspective on the 
intention of the Refugees Act, expressing the need for the Act to:  
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…[b]e interpreted and applied with due regard to the 1951 Convention, its 1967 Protocol, the 
1969 OAU Convention, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and any other relevant 
human rights treaty to which South Africa is or becomes a party.
166
 
 This is a powerful quote. The case law demonstrates that the interpretation and 
application of the Refugees Act is not in line with this intention. Paragraph 41 of the 
Dorcasse judgment is prevalent as the view is that the DHA has lost sight of its obligations 
when processing refugee applications under the Refugees Act. Justice Moshidi expresses 
frustration at the number of matters involving the DHA that come to High Court on an almost 
‘weekly basis’ and the subsequent similar orders continually being made in favour of the 
applicants, and suggests the DHA needs to devise an ‘effective, cost-saving and well-
balanced approach to matters of this nature and immigration issues.’167 The judge states a 
need to ‘re-visit the preamble to the Refugees Act’ which reiterates South Africa’s accession 
to the international laws and obligations resulting from this accession to ‘receive and treat in 
its territory refugees in accordance with the standards and principles established in 
international law.’168 
 The 2007 Kiliko judgment makes reference to South Africa’s international law 
obligations relating to human rights, stating that a failure provide ‘adequate facilities to 
receive; expeditiously consider; and issue asylum seeker permits’ was deemed by Van 
Reenen J to be inconsistent ‘with the State’s obligations in terms of the international 
instruments to which it has become a party.’169 
3.3.1.1 The intentions of international refugee law 
Hathaway and Neve argue that the principal aim of refugee law is ‘not enforceability in a 
strict sense.’170 Instead, it is intended to be a system in which governments collectively agree 
to co-operate for the purpose of containing conflict, pursuing decency and avoiding 
catastrophe. This involves a certain level of compromise on sovereignty to act independently 
in order to achieve a common goal.
171
  
 The 1951 Refugee Convention requires that states provide temporary protection, and its 
structure is such that it ‘establishes a continuum under which entitlement to rights increases 
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as a refugee’s attachment to the asylum state deepens.’172 In instances where an applicant 
holds temporary status for a prolonged period, rights can be claimed accordingly upon 
fulfilment of a ‘durable three-year residence requirement.’173 
 It is argued that the rights provided for by the 1951 Refugee Convention do not suggest 
an intention for rights to be ‘bestowed at the moment of status recognition’174 – that is to say 
the point at which refugee status is granted. This therefore means that those in the application 
process, so-called ‘asylum seekers’, should be awarded full rights under the 1951 Refugee 
Convention from the moment they become known. 
However, in opposition to this idea, governments often maintain they do not owe asylum 
seekers any rights until status has been determined, thus implying that only upon achieving 
full status does an asylum seeker assume their rights under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
This practice presents a distinct disadvantage for those with a genuine claim as it is ‘one’s de 
facto circumstances, and not the official recognition of these circumstances, that give rise to 
Convention refugee status.’175 If the practice is to be to deprive applicants of their rights, then 
decision processes should be almost instant or a practice of presumed entitlement should be 
employed, whereby applicant is presumed to be a refugee until a determination or decision on 
their application and subsequent refugee status is made.
176
 
       Rights of refugee applicants extend beyond the 1951 Refugee Convention.
177
 Other 
instruments of human rights law apply, namely the 1966 covenants of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Politic Rights (‘ICCPR’) and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (‘ICESCR’). The ICCPR assures the majority of rights 
to all those under the authority of a State, both nationals and non-nationals,
178
 and whilst the 
ICESCR allows developing nations to apply discretion when considering the extent to which 
economic rights are afforded, it still is still influential.
179
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3.3.1.2 Administrative justice provisions in international law 
Chapter V of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides for administrative measures to be 
undertaken by the Contracting State. Article 25 covers administrative assistance, and 
provides for assistance from authorities in order to exercise a right when the requirement 
arises.
180
 Either the Contracting State or an international authority can to provide this 
assistance.
181
 
 Despite entitlement to rights, the realistic view is that assistance from a State or 
international authorities is a necessity for refugees to be able to enforce their rights.
182
 The 
importance and extent of this necessity is further amplified by the fact that refugees cannot 
seek protection by way of consular assistance from their country of nationality.
183
 This also 
highlights the vulnerability of refugees as well as the need for receiving states to act lawfully. 
The problem with administrative justice provisions in Article 25 of the 1951 Refugee 
Convention is that the nature of the duty to provide administrative assistance is not set out.
184
 
Furthermore, rights to administrative justice are impractical unless a person is able to access 
the Courts in the host state. Without this, the right to administrative justice is of no value.  
 The 1951 Refugee Convention provides the refugee with the right to access to the Courts 
of a Contracting State through Article 16 of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
185
 The question to 
be asked is whether it can be extended to an asylum seeker due to the term not being 
mentioned in the Convention. Article 16 covers all Contracting States, not just the country in 
which the refugee is situated, and according to the drafting history applies regardless of 
whether the Contracting State has recognised that person as a refugee or not.
186
 This is a 
particularly poignant aspect of administrative justice, as without access to the courts an 
applicant is offered no options. This is appropriately summed up by Hathaway in quoting 
Jowitt J in the English High Court: 
[T]he use of the word “refugee” [in Art.16(1)] is apt to include the aspirant, for were that not 
so, if in fact it had to be established that he did fall within the definition of “refugee” in article 
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1, he might find that he could have no right of audience before the court because the means of 
establishing his status would not be available to him.
187  
3.3.2 South African law 
The prevailing system in South Africa is the section 33 ‘constitutional imperative of just 
administrative action.’188 The current system employs a ‘multiplicity of layers and 
administrative structures’ that are contrary to the proposed streamlined system in the 1997 
Draft Green Paper on International Migration, which endorsed a one-step investigatory 
process involving an oral hearing before an independent status determination authority that 
conforms with all processes and rights given by international and constitutional law.
189
 De la 
Hunt describes the three different structures – the DHA, the Standing Committee and the 
Appeal Board – in the Refugee Status Determination (RSD) system as having ‘different, 
interrelated, and sometimes duplicated functions’190 citing the ability of the Standing 
Committee and the Appeal Board to determine questions of law that are referred to them.
191
 
The entire RSD process from the initial application and the subsequent decision through 
to any appeals and reviews must be made under the consideration of international law.
192
 In 
addition to international law obligations, section 33 of the Constitution gives everyone the 
right to ‘administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.’193 Section 33 
of the Constitution reads as follows: 
(1) Everyone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally 
fair. 
(2) Everyone whose rights have been adversely affected by administrative action has the right 
to be given written reasons. 
(3) National legislation must be enacted to give effect to these rights, and must –  
(a) provide for the review of administrative action by a court or, where appropriate, 
an independent and impartial tribunal; 
(b) impose a duty on the state to give effect to the rights in subsections (1) and (2); 
and 
(c) promote an efficient administration.194 
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The emphasis on the right being conveyed to ‘everyone’ is important, as constitutional 
rights have previously been seen to apply only to South African citizens.
195
 The application 
of section 33 rights were discussed in Tantoush, where it was held that the Bill of Rights is to 
be applied equally to foreigners as it is to South African citizens. The judgment quotes 
paragraph 25 of the Watchenuka judgment in stating that ‘human dignity has no 
nationality.’196  
The Tantoush judgement also decided that the ‘duties imposed by the Bill of Rights are 
binding on the RSDO and the RAB [Refugee Appeal Board], both being organs of state 
exercising public power and performing a public function.’197 Decisions by these organs 
amount to administrative action as defined by section 1 of PAJA, and therefore they are under 
an obligation to interpret legislation whilst promoting the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights and consider international law, in terms of section 39 of the Constitution.’198 
Section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution states any interpretation of the Bill of Rights by a 
court, tribunal or forum ‘must consider international law.’199 In addition, section 233 provides 
for the appropriate application of international law and that interpretation of any legislation 
by the courts must be done so in a manner that prefers ‘any reasonable interpretation of the 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is 
inconsistent with international law.’200 
 PAJA was enacted to provide for the rights to ‘lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair’ 
administrative action afforded under section 33 of the Constitution.
201
 PAJA defines 
administrative action as any decision taken by: 
(a) an organ of state, when- 
(i) exercising a power in terms of the Constitution or a provincial constitution; 
or 
(ii) exercising a public power or performing a public function in terms of any 
legislation; or 
(b) a natural or juristic person, other than an organ of state, when exercising a public 
power or performing a public function in terms of an empowering provision...
202 
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The DHA is an organ of state exercising a public power and performing a public function 
in terms of the Refugees Act, and therefore falls under this definition. 
Section 34 of the Constitution grants access to courts to ‘everyone’.203 With the decision 
in Tantoush discussed above, this can be taken to include both citizens and non-citizens alike 
and therefore serves to further extend the safeguards of these broader rights provided by 
international law within South African law.
204
 Access to courts of law further enforces the 
ability to access administrative justice, and this provision extends the right to ‘lawful, 
reasonable and procedurally fair’ administrative action set out in section 33. 
3.4 RIGHTS OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
CONTEXT 
Section 38(1) of the Refugees Act has seen the Refugee Regulations make regulations 
regarding ‘the conditions of sojourn in the Republic of an asylum seeker, while his or her 
application is under consideration.’205 The effect of these regulations and conditions included 
prohibition on employment and studying.
206
 The rights of asylum seekers to take up work and 
study were discussed in Watchenuka.  
In Watchenuka, the respondents were a mother and son of Zimbabwean nationality who 
had applied for refugee status under the Refugees Act 1998 and had been granted section 22 
asylum permits.
207
 The mother wished to take up employment whilst the son wished to 
undertake a course of study whilst their application for refugee status was processed, however 
their permits contained a condition that prohibited employment and study. An order was 
granted declaring such prohibition to be ultra vires and therefore inconsistent with the 
Constitution, rendering it invalid.
208
  
This case was taken to the Supreme Court of Appeal, and the judgment found that the 
Minister of Home Affairs ‘had no authority to impose the prohibition.’209 The Minister had 
acted in conflict with the Constitution in the absence of the authority to carry out such a 
prohibition of employment and study in this instance. The Standing Committee of Refugee 
Affairs (the ‘Standing Committee’) prohibits employment and study for the first 180 days of 
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a section 22 asylum permit being issued, which was found to be in conflict with the Bill of 
Rights.
210
 
Nugent JA stated in the Watchenuka judgment that: 
[H]uman dignity has no nationality. It is inherent in all people – citizens and non-citizens 
alike – simply because they are human. And while that person happens to be in this country – 
for whatever reason – it must be respected, and is protected, by section 10 of the Bill of 
Rights.
211 
Nugent JA goes on to discuss the section 36 limitations of the Bill of Rights that can be 
appropriately applied to section 10 of the Bill of Rights, whereby the protection of human 
dignity ‘may be limited where the limitation is of general application and is “reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom 
taking into account all relevant factors”.’212 
The judgment considers a decision made by the United States Supreme Court alongside 
the restrictions of section 21 and 22 of the Bill of Rights, with Nugent JA opining that placing 
restrictions on employment for asylum seekers is appropriate.
213
 However, considerations 
must be made when employment is the ‘only reasonable means for the person’s support’ as it 
then becomes a matter of humility and degradation – particularly as South Africa offers no 
support to asylum applicants.
214
 
The human dignity argument also extends to this thesis and to the asylum process 
altogether, and where the situation involves a child that is legally in the country under an 
asylum application, such as in Watchenuka, Nugent JA saw no justifiable reason for 
depriving the applicant of ‘the opportunity for human fulfilment at a critical period.’215  
It is therefore important to take into account the circumstances of the applicant.
216
 Whilst 
asylum applicants are ‘not ordinarily entitled to take up employment or to study pending the 
outcome of his or her application, but there will be circumstances in which it would be 
unlawful to prohibit it.’217  
                                                 
210
 Ibid. para 5. 
211
 Ibid. para 25. 
212
 Ibid. para 28. 
213
 Ibid. para 29. 
214
 Ibid. para 32. 
215
 Ibid. para 36. 
216
 Ibid. para 34. The judgment cites Botha JA in Attorney-General, OFS v Cyril Anderson Investments (Pty) Ltd 
1965 (4) SA 628 (A) at 639. 
217
 Ibid. para 37. 
  
33 
 
The circumstantial approach is not reflected in the South African refugee system. 
Compare Watchenuka with the administrative failings discussed by Amit in a study analysing 
the quality of status determination decisions issued at refugee reception offices,
218
 and it is 
clear that this forms part of the administrative failing in the refugee process. In Amit’s study 
of 324 rejected applications, it was found that virtually none of the decisions contained any 
suitable or proper evaluation of the claims submitted. Identical reasons were given to 
different applicants.
219
 
3.4.1 Procedural rights for asylum seekers in South Africa 
The law provides for a reasonable timeframe wherein the RSD process should be completed. 
The DHA should be guided by the Refugee Regulations, which state that an asylum 
application should be completed within 180 days. This is contained within regulation 3, 
which covers the adjudication process, time periods and conditions.
220
 
In the event that the DHA fails to adjudicate an application within the specific time 
period, the regulations state an applicant is entitled to apply to the Standing Committee for 
permission to work or study, or for relief from any other conditions or restrictions that may 
have been imposed upon them.
221
 This regulation is a clear indication that the asylum process 
is not intended to carry on in perpetuity. The case law demonstrates that despite the law 
stating a time limit for a decision, this is not always the reality. 
The time limit provision is reinforced by section 7(1) of PAJA, which states that 
administrative decisions must be made ‘without unreasonable delay and not later than 180 
days.’222 PAJA also covers administrative rights regarding delays in decision making 
processes. Section 6 of PAJA provides for judicial review of administrative action. Section 
6(1) gives any person the right to begin proceedings in a court or a tribunal for the judicial 
review of an administrative action.  
More specifically, section (6)(1)(g) allows proceedings to be brought in instances where 
the administrative action concerned failure to take a decision.
223
 Section 6(3) elaborates on 
this insomuch as it provides for scenarios for bringing proceedings where an administrator 
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has unreasonably delayed making a decision – this is covered by section 6(3)(b), which also 
states that, in addition to an event of unreasonable delay, a person may bring proceedings if: 
(i) an administrator has a duty to take a decision; 
(ii) a law prescribes a period within which the administrator is required to take that 
decision; and 
(iii) the administrator has failed to take that decision before the expiration of that 
period.
224
 
The Refugee Regulations and PAJA collectively provide for administrative justice and 
rights when the procedure is not followed according to the law.  
3.5 CONCLUSION 
The normative framework in theory provides a strong set of administrative rights set out in 
both international and domestic law in South Africa. The international law is supported by 
the UNCHR Handbook which has gained strength through being used as soft law in a number 
of case law judgments relating to the refugee processing system in South Africa. 
 Administrative justice takes its form in international refugee law through Article 25 of the 
1951 Refugee Convention, and is supported by Article 16 rights to access the courts of a host 
state – something which is essential if a person is to be able to achieve their right to 
administrative justice. In domestic law, the Bill of Rights in the Constitution and PAJA 
provide for consideration of international law and give administrative justice rights to 
everyone, which case law has decided includes both nationals and non-nationals. Case law 
has also determined that the duties contained within the Bill of Rights are directly applicable 
to the DHA as an organ of state exercising public power. 
 Despite the law being theoretically strong, in practice applicants are often denied their 
rights due to the way in which recognition of refugee status is perceived to be the moment 
with which a refugee is offered legal protection. This disadvantages those with genuine 
claims, and the intention of the 1951 Refugee Convention is for claims to be decided on the 
de facto circumstances of the individual applicant. 
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Chapter 4 – The suitability of the normative framework 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
An important aspect of the law is not only its ability to be effective but also its ability to be 
understood and accessible – particularly in the context of refugee law, where strict 
application and adherence is of utmost importance given the potential prejudices and 
resulting dangers stemming from misapplication. It is one thing for the law to function in 
practice, however if it is not easy for those seeking to use it to understand nor access then it 
could argued to be failing those it seeks to protect. 
4.2 SUITABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The silence of international law on procedure has left open gaps whereby states can 
implement their own systems that do not necessarily follow the intentions of the international 
statutes. The fact the UNHCR Handbook is in existence demonstrates this, as the need for 
additional guidance perhaps suggests the drafters missed including provisions relating to the 
processing of refugee applications. It could be argued this was done to preserve State 
sovereignty, although when this is considered alongside the universal approach to human 
rights it is unlikely this was the intention of the drafters. 
 The 1951 Refugee Convention claims to be the most ‘comprehensive’ set of refugee 
rights. Therefore, the question must be asked why the law is silent on procedure. Whilst this 
is a potential omission that could render the law insufficient, it is important to analyse what it 
does provide for. It essentially elaborates and codifies Article 14 of the UDHR, which 
provides an effective and positive reinforcement for the rights of those seeking protection as 
refugees. It provides for an extensive definition of when a person becomes a refugee, and 
encompasses rights seen in other legal instruments, such as rights to not be discriminated 
against and the freedom of practice religion, as well as welfare rights to housing, education, 
public relief and social security.  
 The silence on procedure makes the law unnecessary complicated, however the issue of 
State sovereignty is important and the balance between this and universal human rights 
presents a problem. Whilst it is speculative to suggest this is the reason for the absence of a 
set procedure in international law, it can be argued the rights contained within are intended to 
act as sufficient guidance for how the procedure should be set out. Furthermore, the 
acceptance of the UNCHR Handbook in case law demonstrates its importance in legal 
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interpretation. This perhaps suggests value in a uniformed approach to refugee law and 
therefore a contrast to the silence on procedure in international law. 
 The access to justice and administrative measures contained in Articles 16 and 25 of the 
1951 Refugee Convention seems to sufficiently provide assistance in exercising prescribed 
rights. The law here is quite ambiguous as to its specificity, however with rights being 
extensively provided for in international law and therefore in any subsequent laws that are 
intended to give effect to these rights, it is fair to argue that whenever a refugee is denied a 
right to which they are entitled, a State should provide necessary assistance to ensure this is 
corrected. If international law is adhered to then there should not be a lack of administrative 
justice. However, it is not clear if this covers all rights or just rights that ‘would normally 
require the assistance of authorities.’225 
 During the drafting debates it was decided that certain rights such as legal assistance and 
exemption from caution judicatum solvi would only apply to refugees with an established 
‘habitual residence’ in a state.226 Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 16 offer more practical 
assistance to refugees with habitual residence and states therefore have a duty waive court or 
other fees required to be paid by a refugee in order to pursue a court action. This means that 
those who have not established the necessary habitual residence are only eligible to receive 
the same access to the courts as non-citizens generally, as provided for by Article 16(1).
227
 In 
order to meet the requirements of habitual residence for the purposes of Article 16(2) and 
16(3), a refugee’s presence should be ongoing – it needs to be more that a stay of short 
duration but does not need to be that of permanent residence.
228
  
4.3 SUITABILITY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
The South African legislation successfully implements the international law. The procedure 
sets out a clear step-by-step process highlighting both the obligations of the applicant as well 
as the obligations of the DHA and its administrators charged with processing and 
adjudicating the applications. 
It is well set out and easy to follow and the Constitution and PAJA together provide for 
administrative justice rights and access to international law and all the rights contained within 
it. PAJA is particularly thorough on public authorities that are exercising their respective 
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powers. Whilst the written law in South Africa suitably incorporates its international superior, 
the next question surrounds the ability of the legislation to be understood by the refugees 
seeking to use it. 
 With sufficient legal representation, there is no reason why an applicant would not be 
able to appropriately understand the legislation. The Refugees Act is has no particularly 
unusual aspects to it. In contrast, it sets out each particular provision clearly and the wording 
is generally reasonable. The confusion would perceivably arrive when the actual application 
of the law is not in accordance with the written legislation. 
 Administrative justice rights are mentioned in the Refugees Act through reference to 
PAJA alongside those provisions giving guidance on consideration of asylum applications
229
 
and withdrawal of refugee status.
230
 The preamble acknowledges international legal 
obligations to ‘receive and treat in its territory refugees in accordance with the standards and 
principles established in international law.’231 In this respect, the law can be deemed to be 
very transparent as to its intentions and the rights contained therein, serving as an effective 
communication of the rights and protections it offers. 
4.4 COMPARISON WITH OTHER NATIONAL LEGISLATION 
The ability of applicants to fully and clearly understand the law is of course subjective. Each 
individual may have a better or worse understanding of the law than the next person. 
However, when compared to other national legislation, it is fair to say that South Africa’s 
legislation is set out in a manner than can be suitably understood by those with a non-legal 
background.  
4.4.1 The United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom, for example, the refugee and asylum laws are complicated. The UK’s 
Home Office provides an ‘Asylum Policy Instruction’ document that demonstrates the 
complexity of the UK’s version of the refugee system.232 Firstly, it refers to the 1951 Refugee 
Convention,
233
 then the European Union legislation to which the country is bound.
234
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Secondly, the domestic legislation is referred to – this contains three separate instruments in 
the Immigration Rules; the Asylum and immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004; 
and the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (as amended).
235
 This network of 
different applicable legislation makes it difficult for the process to be easily understood. 
 With regards to administrative justice, the absence of a constitution in the UK means a 
reliance on the common law. The concept does not have a singular definition in UK law, but 
instead is ‘generally associated with a more holistic approach to citizen redress against 
government in which judicial review is only one mechanism among many others.’236 The 
Human Rights Act 1998 covers actions of public authorities and powers to take remedial 
action.
237
 Administrative justice is defined by the United Kingdom’s Tribunals, Courts and 
Enforcement Act 2007 as ‘the overall system by which the administrative decisions affecting 
individuals are taken, including the procedures and law governing such decisions and the 
process for resolving disputes and airing grievances in relation to them.’238 This lack of any 
singular definition is quite a contrast to the system in South Africa. 
4.4.2 Australia 
Australia’s asylum and refugee laws are governed by the Migration Act of 1958. It makes 
clear reference to the 1951 Refugee Convention; however the similarities to the South 
African system stop there. It is not specific to refugees, but instead provides for a vast range 
of governance covering non-citizens in general.
239
 Australia employs an encampment system, 
both on the Australian mainland and an off-shore facility located in Nauru.
240
 In the absence 
of a refugee-specific piece of legislation, coupled with the off-shore processing practices, it is 
fair to say the law has the potential to be perceived as being significantly more complex to 
the untrained legal reader. Australia has faced criticism for its use of off-shore processing 
centres on the island nation of Nauru, which has been argued to be a human rights issue in 
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itself. The applicants through this refugee system often complain of a lack of access to 
rights.
241
 
 Administrative law at the federal level in Australia was codified from the common law by 
way of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977.
242
 This imposed a duty 
upon decision makers to give written reasons for decisions, which made challenging 
decisions a lot more feasible.
243
 This codification bears resemblance to PAJA, and therefore 
may present a better understanding of rights and entitlement; the use of an encampment 
system makes the whole process far less accessible to refugee applicants.  
4.5 INACCESSIBILITY 
Whilst physical barriers to accessibility exist through the Australian example of the use of 
encampment systems, a lack of understanding or knowledge of a legal system may appear 
complicated to an unfamiliar mind and will therefore require legal assistance. However, 
sufficient knowledge is not the last barrier to accessing a legal system.
244
 
Levels of assistance stems further for those that do not speak the language of a 
Contracting State and interpreters may therefore be required. South Africa provides a number 
of suitable examples of this. Section 24(2) of the Refugees Act requires an RSDO to ‘have 
due regard for the rights set out in section 33 of the Constitution, and in particular, ensure that 
the applicant fully understands the procedures, his or her rights and responsibilities and the 
evidence presented.’245 Interpreters form an important part in ensuring these requirements are 
met.
246
 This issue is far from straightforward, however, as the Refugee Regulations limit the 
burden of providing an interpreter in regulation 5(1) to such times as are ‘practicable and 
necessary’247 and further narrow the scope of the obligation in regulations 5(2) and 5(3) by 
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shifting the responsibility to the applicant.
248
 This has the effect of putting an applicant in a 
vulnerable position or at risk of exploitation and damages the procedural right of an applicant 
to understand and participate in their own hearing.
249
 
 The issue of interpretation has arisen in case law, whereby Bozalek J held in Katshingu 
that that an RSDO’s decision is rendered invalid when there is a failure to provide an 
interpreter competent in both English and the mother tongue of the applicant as no hearing or 
process could be deemed to have taken place.
250
 Failures to provide competent interpreters 
have also arisen in Amit’s work, where non-professional interpreters were chosen at random 
from the crowd of asylum seekers at a RRO.’251 If no hearing has taken place, then the right 
to a fair hearing is not given. 
 Similarly, legal assistance should also be given where an applicant does not understand 
the legal system. Section 3(3)(a) of PAJA gives a person the right to obtain assistance and 
legal representation in order to ensure procedurally fair administrative action – specifically in 
‘serious or complex case.’252 Amit’s work has regularly found cases where applicants are 
unaware of the legal system and require assistance to follow proper procedure. One such 
example is the need to submit written appeals, which is described as being ‘a requirement 
most asylum seekers are unable to meet without assistance from a legal service provider.’253 
 Financial constraints are described by the UNHCR as ‘usually having a huge impact on 
access to justice.’254 Court proceedings often carry a heavy financial burden involving costs 
for various aspects such as lawyers’ fees, travel and time, and in circumstances where a 
person’s financial situation creates inequality before the law this can amount to 
discrimination.
255
 
 The UNHCR identifies the issue of inaccessibility as being particularly relevant to asylum 
seekers by stating: 
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[C]ases involving immigrants, asylum seekers and ethnic minorities are revelatory, since 
cultural and language barriers compound the already precarious situation in which they find 
themselves in regard to the effective exercise of their rights before the courts.
256
 
4.6 CONCLUSION  
The international law is comprehensive regarding rights, despite it falling short of providing 
guidance on procedural aspects. However, the existence of the UNHCR Handbook offering 
guidance on procedure has given a voice to the silence. The administrative justice provisions 
in Article 25 of the 1951 Refugee Convention are absent of any specific definition, which 
makes it relatively vague. However, it does demonstrate recognition of the vulnerability of a 
refugee and the subsequent necessity of administrative assistance being provided by a 
Contracting State as a way of mitigating this vulnerability. Although not part of chapter V of 
the 1951 Refugee Convention and the title of administrative measures, the right to access 
courts of law under Article 16 provides an appropriate administrative justice provision with 
regards to appeals of decisions made during the RSD process. 
The incorporation of international obligations into South African law is done so in a clear 
and concise manner, with the legislation expressly designed to give effect accordingly. The 
case law has demonstrated a desire by the courts to ensure the international law provisions 
are applied correctly and effectively. The law theoretically provides a strong level of 
protection to refugees entering South Africa, and is comparably more understandable than 
other legal mechanisms in other countries offering protection.  
Underneath the incorporation of international law, the thorough codification of the 
constitutional rights to administrative justice through PAJA underpins an intention for the law 
to succeed. In order to do this it needs to be effective, and an ability for it to understood by 
those seeking to rely on it is a step towards that success.  
Where the suitability fails in South Africa is with its accessibility. Certain assistance such 
as interpreters, legal and financial aid is often vital in ensuring sufficient access to rightful 
administrative justice. Amit’s work has uncovered situations where applicants require this 
sort of assistance in order to properly participate in the procedure, and case law has 
demonstrated that the decisions of an RSDO can be rendered invalid if the right levels of 
accessibility are not given.  
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Chapter 5 – The South African problem 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Administrative justice forms a fundamental part of human rights law instruments, particularly 
in the context of refugee rights. With such grave potential consequences at stake under the 
principle of non-refoulement, it is absolutely vital that sufficient administrative justice is 
carried out when determining the application of an asylum seeker so as to provide the 
protection that international legal mechanisms are intended to afford. 
 The UNHCR Handbook provides valuable guidance on sufficient protection to be 
provided to refugees.
257
 It has been considered soft law in a number of jurisdictions, with a 
South African example being in Tantoush. Here the Handbook was used as an aid for the 
interpretation and implementation of the Refugees Act in order to establish the required 
burden and standard of proof in the status determination process.
258
 There are also annual 
conclusions on various topics issued annually by the UNHCR Executive Committee which 
have be used by the courts in different jurisdictions to interpret and implement their relevant 
domestic legislation.
259
 
 Guidelines on the procedural process for determining refugee status are provided in part 
two of the Handbook, listing ‘certain basic requirements’260 that are to be met when 
considering an asylum application. One such requirement is that an applicant who is not 
recognised as a refugee should ‘be given a reasonable time to appeal for a formal 
reconsideration of the decision, either to the same or to a different authority, whether 
administrative or judicial, according to the prevailing system’261 which is the Constitution in 
South Africa.  
 Despite such suitable codification of international law in the domestic law in South 
Africa,
262
 there are continued failings to give asylum applicants the rights to just and fair 
administrative action in the status determination process. The case law demonstrates the scale 
of the failings, and this chapter will analyse the particulars of these failings from the specific 
viewpoint of the right to administrative justice and human dignity. 
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5.2 WHAT WENT WRONG IN SOUTH AFRICA? 
A number of studies conducted on the processing of refugees in South Africa have often lead 
to similar conclusions – that the refugee status determination process in South Africa is 
failing those applying for the protection it is supposed to offer. Roni Amit has conducted a 
number of studies analysing these failing, with one particular piece exploring 240 status 
determination decisions in 2011. The study looks at the quality of the decisions made in 
accordance with international and domestic refugee law, as well as the policy and practice of 
the DHA and the subsequent adherence to the law.
263
  
5.2.1 Highlighting the failures 
Citing constitutional rights to just administrative action, Amit lists certain requirements that a 
RSDO must meet in order to adhere to the law. Any decisions must provide clear reasons for 
that decision; must correctly apply the law; must be based on relevant considerations; must 
not be arbitrary; and must be both rational and reasonable, showing a logical connection to 
the information and reasons relating to any decision.
264
 
Amit’s work identifies several specific problems. In terms of legal application, errors in 
law such as misapplications of the concept of ‘well-founded fear’ and ‘persecution’ – both of 
which are used in the 1951 Refugee Convention definition of a refugee
265
 – and of section 
3(b) of the Refugees Act which provides for protection of those fleeing from general 
conditions of instability.  In addition, Amit cites the improper use of the credibility standard, 
the wrong burden and standard of proof, and improper use of the manifestly unfounded 
standard
266
 (which is defined in the Refugees Act as ‘an application for asylum made on 
grounds other than those on which such an application may be made under this Act’267). 
The study also found administrative errors such as reference to the wrong claimant or 
their respective country and inaccurate assessment of the conditions in the country the 
applicant is fleeing from.
268
 Crucially, Amit identifies administrative justice as one of three 
key concerns found as a result of the study, whereby applicants were denied their 
‘constitutionally guaranteed right to just administrative action, which requires government 
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actions to be fair, transparent, and accountable.’269 This point is further elaborated on by 
Kerfoot and Schreier in studying the reception of asylum applications and the subsequent 
barriers to access faced by applicants.
270
 Two other concerns are a lack of protection and the 
outright functional failure of the DHA with regards to the asylum system.
271
 
5.2.2 Failings lead to a denial of rights 
The consequences of insufficient administrative justice go further than affecting the 
applicants. Not only can failure to administrate correctly affect the individuals seeking 
international law protection by violating the non-refoulement principle, but its disregard can 
erode the rule of law. Amit writes that it ‘undermines public confidence in the institutions of 
the state, and threatens the vibrancy of democracy.’272 It also allows individuals to exploit the 
refugee system, which has the effect of further diminishing public confidence in the 
system.
273
  
Many asylum applicants do not understand their right to appeal.
274
 This makes the rights 
to administrative justice all the more crucial, as the reasons given for a negative decision are 
the basis on which an applicant must base their appeal. If these reasons are incorrect, vague 
or insufficient then the chances of a successful appeal are heavily reduced – something which 
should not happen when those forced to return to their country of origin face potentially life-
threatening situations.
275
 The only other option for applicants may be to remain in South 
Africa illegally which will further expose their lack of protection. The decision of the RSD is 
aptly described by Amit as being ‘central to whether South Africa fulfils its international and 
domestic legal obligations to provide protection to persons fleeing persecution and 
conflict.’276  
The result of poor decision letters has the effect of turning the Appeal Board into a court 
as it is ‘forced to re-hear most cases that come before it in order to reach a decision.’277 In 
another Amit’s studies, 324 decision letters were analysed and not a single one was found to 
be ‘fulfilling the Constitutional guarantee of administrative justice.’278 The legal requirement 
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for sufficient, detailed reasons were instead replaced errors of law, a lack of case-specific 
decisions, a distinct lack of provided reasons and extensive failure to apply the mind.
279
 In 
finding such a substantive failure to meet administrative justice standards, Amit describes the 
RSD process as being fatally flawed.
280
 
5.3 INVOKING ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE TO ADDRESS THE 
FAILINGS 
The problems facing applicants going through the South African asylum and refugee system 
can be demonstrated through case law, which uncovers a number of areas which hinder 
refugee rights in South Africa. These are attributed to a number of factors and include errors 
of law that lead to a restriction of human rights and human dignity, the adverse impact of 
inappropriate and incorrect administrative action, and incidences whereby grounds for review 
are triggered by negative decisions. These areas demonstrate the misapplication of the law 
and the subsequent denial of administrative justice in South Africa’s refugee system. 
5.3.1 RRO closures 
The issue of RRO closures in South Africa is described by Kerfoot and Schreier as ‘the 
harshest form of a barrier to access’281 faced by applicants. Closures began in 2011 as part of 
a government plan to move RROs to border areas in the north of the country.
282
 Six RROs 
existed at the beginning of 2011, and since then the offices in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth 
and Cape Town either closed completely or refused to accept any new applications.
283
 This 
brought about an outpouring of litigation challenging the lawfulness of these decisions to 
close or restrict access.
284
 Each challenge was successful, with the High Court deeming the 
decisions to be unlawful.
285
 
 The SASA case concerned the closure of the RRO in Port Elizabeth.
286
 The applicants 
sought to have the decision to close the office declared unlawful on the basis that it was taken 
without consultation with the Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs – a requirement under 
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section 8(1) of the Refugees Act.
287
 It was also argued by the applicants that the decision to 
close was taken irrationally, unreasonably and was based on irrelevant considerations. It was 
also absent of any proper public consultation or opportunity for those affected by the decision 
to make representations.
288
 
 In the High Court judgment, Pickering J held that: 
[I]n all the circumstances I am satisfied that the decision taken by the second respondent to 
close the Port Elizabeth refugee Reception Office without having first consulted with the 
Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs is unlawful and falls to be set aside.
289 
 Pickering J describes one of the core functions of a RRO as providing ‘the necessary 
administrative machinery to enable new applicants to apply for asylum.’290 This quote, along 
with the overall judgment in SASA, demonstrates the importance of RROs in ensuring 
sufficient administrative justice is afforded to asylum seekers.  
Failure to consult the Standing Committee arose again in the first Scalabrini case of 2012, 
where a High Court order was issued to reopen the Cape Town RRO on grounds of a breach 
of the provisions of PAJA. These closures make it difficult for those residing and arriving in 
certain areas of the country to attend RROs.
291
 This view is expressed in the 2013 Scalabrini 
judgment, which argues the requirement of applicants residing in Cape Town will ‘need to 
spend time and money to travel’292 to RROs which is described as ‘grossly unreasonable’293 
and presents problems to those applicants that are working or have dependents. The 2017 
Scalabrini judgment held the decision to close the Cape Town RRO was irrational
294
 and 
therefore unlawful under the constitutional principle of legality as well as the provisions of 
section 8 of the Refugees Act.
295
 
5.3.2 Where access is denied to the asylum system 
The 2007 Kiliko case saw claims that only a limited number of applicants were allowed to 
enter the RRO in Cape Town to make an application for asylum, which meant they were 
unable to start the process and were subsequently detained as illegal foreigners under section 
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1 of the Immigration Act.
296
 The State argued the backlog of applications caused by the high 
numbers of refugees entering the country was the reason for the restricted access to the RRO, 
however this response was deemed to be unsatisfactory and the court cited international law 
obligations on the State to ‘respect the basic human rights of any foreigner who has entered 
its territory.’297 
 The 2008 Kiliko judgment describes the denial of access to a section 22 permit as 
affording an applicant nothing but ‘disadvantages and disabilities’298 when referring to the 
restrictions and limitations faced by those found to be illegal foreigners under the 
Immigration Act. A section 22 permit protects applicants from apprehension, detention and 
deportation, and offers other rights to employment, education and other activities that ‘human 
beings ordinarily participate in.’299 Failure to issue section 22 permits ‘impacts deleteriously 
upon or threatens to so impact upon at least his or her human dignity and the freedom and 
security of his or her person.’300 
The practice of limiting the number of applicants processed restricts rights, and the extent 
of these failures is summed up by Van Reeren J in the 2008 Kiliko judgment: 
[T]he affidavits of those who have repeatedly but unsuccessfully attempted to obtain section 
22 permits paint a graphic but debilitating picture of the gross humanity which is being meted 
out to asylum seekers because of the failure on the part of the South African authorities to 
fully adhere to the International Instruments as regards to the treatment of refugees assented 
to by the Government and to fully comply with the laws passed by it in order to give effect 
thereto.
301 
Access to RROs has been challenged in a number of cases. In addition to failures by the 
Cape Town, the offices in Johannesburg and Pretoria have also been challenged. The DHA 
was exposed in Tafira for having too few refugee reception officers to deal with the number 
of applications being received,
302
 and the consequences of such under-resourcing lead to 
improper and unlawful practices, such as the use of ‘appointment slips’ containing a date on 
which the applicant must return to the RRO to consult with an officer
303
 and pre-screening 
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procedures whereby the Zimbabwean applicant in question were told they did not qualify for 
refugee status – one person was even ‘advised’ that she did not meet the requirements.304 
The issue of under-resourcing arises in Voortrekker Road, where the issue at hand was 
initially a planning and land use dispute between the owner of the property adjacent to the 
premises being used for the relocated RRO in Cape Town.
305
 Part of the applicant’s argument 
extended to the issue of the under-resourced RRO leading to a large crowd of asylum seekers 
gathering outside the gates and spilling out on to the roads of the RRO in order to increase 
their chances of being processed that day.
306
 There were also incidents of applicants sleeping 
on the street outside the premises. In the judgment, Binns-Ward J described the RRO as being 
‘unable to deal adequately with the average number of asylum seekers who present 
themselves daily.’307 
 The problems identified in Tafira link with Kiliko whereby failure to issue section 22 
permits results in those applicants being at risk of becoming illegal foreigners under the 
Immigration Act and therefore subsequently exposed to the disadvantages pertained thereof. 
The appointment slips issued offers no rights similar to the section 22 permit, nor does it 
offer any similar protection.
308
 
The aims of the section 22 asylum permit and its role in terms of protection are discussed 
further in Arse, which saw the applicant unlawfully detained under the Immigration Act on 
section 23 grounds for being an illegal foreigner as his asylum transit permit has expired. The 
applicant contested he tried to enter the RRO in Port Elizabeth but was unable to gain 
entrance due to lengthy queues.
309
 The judgment considered the conflicts between the 
Immigration Act and the Refugees Act, with a focus on achieving the ‘spirit of the 
international instruments the Refugees Act seeks to give effect to.’310 It was decided the 
applicant had not exhausted all rights to review or appeal under the Refugees Act and 
therefore his detention was unlawful.
311
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5.3.3 Delay in decision-making 
Regulation 3(1) of the Refugee Regulations states an application will ‘generally be 
adjudicated by the Department of Home Affairs within 180 days.’312 It is important, 
therefore, to consider the implications resulting from a failure to adjudicate a RSD within the 
prescribed timeframe. 
 One such consequence of delays in decision making is the creation of an ‘unjustifiable 
prejudice’ as described by Thring J in Ryobeza.313 In this instance, the applicant was granted 
refugee status and had been a continuous resident in South Africa for more than five years 
and therefore wished to apply for an immigration permit under section 25 of the Aliens 
Control Act 1991, with a view to progressing to permanent residency.
314
 This is covered by 
section 27(c) of the Refugees Act as long as it is certified by the Standing Committee that the 
person concerned will remain a refugee indefinitely.
315
 
 The application sought certification from the Standing Committee in September 2002 by 
way of a letter demonstrating ongoing high levels of violence in Burundi, the applicant’s 
home country. No response was received despite a written reminder being sent in October 
2002. An affidavit was filed in December 2002 and the DHA stated in an opposing affidavit 
in February 2013 that the applicant was ‘expecting the impossible.’ This was absent of any 
explanation as to why this was considered impossible and why the committee had not 
provided so much as an acknowledgment of the applicant’s request.316 
 The applicant applied to the court on 24 December 2002 as a matter of urgency due to 
two underlying reasons. The first was that his personal and professional life is being 
comprised by the delay, citing the failure to get a loan from the bank in order to purchase a 
car which he needed for work.
317
 The second submission questioned the legitimacy of the 
committee members and sought to have them removed. This was argued to be urgent because 
it is important for the committee members to know whether they are acting lawfully with 
regard to proper administration of the Refugees Act
318
 – which is to be independent and to 
function without bias according to section 9 of the Refugees Act.
319
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 In the judgment, Thring J made an order declaring the appointment of the Standing 
Committee members to be ultra vires, unlawful, unconstitutional and invalid
320
 due to the 
members being employees of the DHA and therefore lacking sufficient independence. The 
respondent was also ordered to receive the immigration permit application from the applicant 
and consider it accordingly.
321
 
5.3.4 Errors in decision-making 
PAJA entrenches the right to administrative justice,
322
 and the basic requirements with 
regards to RSDs are contained in section 3(2)(b) of PAJA, including adequate notice of the 
decision, reasonable opportunity to make representations, clear statements of administrative 
action, adequate notice of any right of review or internal appeal and adequate notice of the 
right to request reasons for any decision.
323
 
5.3.4.1 Failure to elicit relevant information 
Another notable error of law during status determination is the duty of the RSDO to elicit 
information.
324
 This is governed by section 24(1) of the Refugees Act and permits liaison 
with the UNHCR with regards to specific incidents and cases, and also allows an RSDO to 
provide any relevant information to the UNHCR as part of any consultation over a particular 
case (although this requires the permission of the applicant).
325
 The aim of this is to assist the 
RSDO to get as clear a picture as possible in order to make an appropriate and correct 
decision.
326
 A demonstration of this failing is seen in Katabana whereby an application was 
refused on grounds that were not permitted under the Refugees Act.
327
 The applicant had 
claimed he was forced to flee the DRC after his mother was burned to death by the 
community on suspicion of witchcraft. The RSDO had been extremely brief in the decision 
and failed to elicit information as to the area from which the applicant had fled. The Court 
later found that to return him to the DRC would contravene the principle of non-refoulement 
by exposing him to an ‘excruciating set of dangers which seems wrong, unjust and unfair.’328 
 In addition to eliciting information, any information used to consider information relating 
to an applicant’s country of origin in the decision making process must be shared with the 
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applicant in the interests of procedural fairness. In AOL, Swain J stated in the judgment that 
‘it was clear that an individual had to be furnished with all information that was prejudicial to 
his or her case before a decision was taken.’329 The facts in this case demonstrated this was 
not done, and the decision was set aside on these grounds as well as the lack of any indication 
that the initial decision to refuse the application was actually made by an RSDO under 
section 24(3)(b) and 24(3)(c) of the Refugees Act, which consequently meant the Appeal 
Board did not have jurisdiction to review the decision.
330
 Furthermore, no notice of the appeal 
hearing was issued to the applicant and therefore appropriate legal representation was not 
obtained, which was deemed to be an example of procedural unfairness.
331
 
5.3.4.2 Sufficient reasons not provided 
A common criticism of the DHA amongst scholars is insufficient reasons provided to 
applicants for negative decisions. This is a regular occurrence in the findings of Amit’s 
work,
332
 and important rights exist when potentially adverse consequences can result from 
negative refugee status decisions.
333
 The RSDO is obliged to provide written reasons for 
refusal to the applicant
334
 to ensure rights to reasons for adverse administrative action are 
afforded. The case law around this issue presents a number of different arguments. Firstly, in 
Katabana the judgment accepted that ‘a body such as the RSDO is not a court and is not 
required to prepare a judgment’335 or an extensive set of legal reasons, however the judge 
goes on to emphasise the need for ‘great care’ to be taken in making these decisions.336 
 Secondly, due to the disadvantages to an individual being declared an illegal foreigner 
and the adverse effect this can have, particularly in the case rejected applications, it is 
understandable for that individual to want to know why that decision was taken. This was the 
view of Mokgoro J in Koyabe, whereby the example was used to justify and emphasise the 
importance of communicating true reasons to the applicant in the event that they wish to seek 
a ‘meaningful review.’337 Amit writes in her study of RSDO rejection letters there were 
sometimes no reasons given at all or were incredibly general in nature, sometimes even cut 
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and pasted paragraphs that did not assess the individual claim whatsoever.
338
 The key 
message is that each application must be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
 Assessing asylum applications of a case-by-case basis is mentioned in Dorcasse. Moshidi 
J, quoting Professor John Dugard in International Law – A South African Perspective, states: 
[A]ssessments as to whether an individual will face persecution if returned to a particular state 
must be made on a case by case basis taking into account, on the one hand, the notions of 
individual integrity and human dignity and, on the other hand, the manner and degree to 
which they stand to be injured.
339  
 Not only does this emphasise the right to human dignity in the assessment process as a 
whole, but it also emphasises the importance of the non-refoulement principle in safeguarding 
a person from persecution. 
Dass et al write that ‘where any administrative action is taken which adversely affects the 
rights of refugees and asylum seekers; they are entitled to request written reasons for that 
decision.’340 When this is viewed alongside the findings in Amit’s work the extent of the 
failed duties is exposed.
341
 Failure to provide written reasons is contrary to section 5(1) of 
PAJA, which provides that such written reasons should be provided within 90 days of the 
request.
342
 Section 5(2) states that the given reasons must be adequate and further reinforces 
the 90 day timeline.
343
 
Section 5(3) of PAJA is crucial as it provides that in the event of a failure to provide 
adequate reasons for the administrative action taken, the presumption is that the respective 
action was taken without good reason.
344
 When the wording of this section is applied to 
Amit’s findings, any incident where there was found to be either no reason or inadequate 
reasons given for RSDs, then those particular decisions should be presumed to be decisions 
made in absentia of any lawful or valid reason and are therefore by default in contravention 
of the legal requirements of PAJA. 
5.3.4.3 Errors in law 
Errors in law can result in restrictions of human rights and human dignity. Section 10 of the 
Constitution provides for human dignity, giving everyone the right to ‘inherent dignity and 
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the right to have their dignity respected and protected.’345 Human dignity is an issue that 
arises in a number of case law judgments. 
In Ersumo, the applicant was an Ethiopian national who was arrested for not reporting to 
an RRO within 14 days of being issued with an asylum transit permit
346
 – which is a 
requirement under section 21 of the Refugees Act. The applicant argued the section 21 
requirements were impossible for him to comply with as officials at the RRO were not 
assisting all those in the queue.
347
 He also claimed he had been mugged and lost his permit in 
the process. The State, in response, disputed his claims citing incorrect factual detail and 
contradictions in the story.
348
 
 Despite the State arguing that, regardless of the claimed circumstances of the applicant 
relating to the lost permit, regulation 2(1)(a) of the Refugee Regulations requires asylum 
applications to be made without delay, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that whilst 
regulation 2(1)(a) requires there to be no undue delay it also fails to specify a particular time 
period for making an application.
349
 Furthermore, the Refugees Act does not state that a delay 
in making an application constitutes grounds for refusal of a proper claim for refugee status. 
This is supported further by regulation 2(2),
350
 whereby anyone found to be in the country in 
contravention of the Immigration Act that expresses an intention to apply for asylum is to be 
permitted to do so and therefore shall be issued a section 23(1) asylum transit permit allowing 
them to lodge an asylum application at an RRO within 14 days.
351
  
The Court found no reason for denying the applicant his regulation 2(2) rights and an 
asylum transit permit was issued. To avoid the applicant being prevented from applying for 
asylum again, the Minister and Director-General of Home Affairs were directed to give the 
applicant priority upon his attendance at an RRO.
352
 
The importance of regulation 2(2) is emphasised in Bula, particularly how it is designed 
as such to ensure ‘genuine asylum seekers are not turned away.’353 Bula further emphasised 
that once an intention to apply for asylum is expressed, they have the right to be treated 
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according to regulation 2(2) whether that intention is expressed immediately or not.
354
 The 
applicant therefore has the right under section 22 to have their case heard by a RSDO who is 
responsible for determining the merits of a claim, as the law determines it is an RSDO 
responsibility and not the responsibility of a court investigation.
355
 
The argument extends beyond pursuing the rights of refugees regarding decisions made 
by the various bodies in Tantoush, and demonstrates that decisions made by RSDOs and the 
Appeal Board constitute administrative action under the meaning of section 1 of PAJA.
356
 
This example provides a basis for other failures in the processing system and their respective 
duties under PAJA. It sets out the grounds for when an applicant is entitled to review, and 
draws on section 6 of PAJA by stating that it ‘concretely embodies the constitutional right to 
just administrative action, and codifies and supplants the common law grounds for judicial 
review.’357 The judgment cites Bato Star Fishing, which is an environmental law case that 
determined that matters relating to PAJA became constitutional matters by virtue of the fact 
that PAJA is designed to give effect to section 33 of the Constitution.
358
 
Although there are a number of grounds for review, Tantoush can be used to demonstrate 
grounds for review and appeals of RSDs in the context of rights to a fair hearing and 
decisions made with errors of law.
359
 The main arguments put forward by the applicant in this 
case were that the proceedings were procedurally unfair and the decision contained material 
errors of fact and law, and that the decision was not rationally connected to the information 
presented, nor were the considerations relevant and that it was therefore unreasonable.
360
 The 
submission was that the decision was unconstitutional and unlawful due to bias and prejudice 
towards the applicant.
361
 JR Murphy agreed with the applicant’s submission and the decisions 
of the RSDO and the Appeal Board was set aside and the applicant was granted refugee status 
under the Refugees Act.
362
  
In Tantoush, the first error of law surrounded the failure of the Appeal Board to consider 
the correctness of the RSDO decision. As a result of this failure, the decision is set aside 
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under section 6(2)(a) and 6(2)(f)(i) of PAJA, both of which provide provisions for judicial 
review where the administrator was not authorised to take the respective action.
363
 
 The second error of law related to the ‘appropriate standard of proof applicable in the 
determination of whether an applicant has a “well-founded fear” of persecution in order to 
qualify for refugee status under section 3(a) of the [Refugees] Act.’364 The judgment 
describes the well-founded fear principle as the ‘primary question for determination before 
the RSDO.’365 States are in charge of forming their own procedures in the absence of any set 
procedure in the 1951 Refugee Convention. In South Africa, the common-law dictates the 
applicable standard of proof.
366
 In criminal matters the threshold is beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and in civil matters the threshold is lower with a balance of probabilities.
367
 However, 
in Tantoush the judgment determined this approach to be incorrect, based on prior case law 
that established the ‘appropriate standard is one of “a reasonable possibility of persecution”’ 
and therefore takes the form of a lower threshold.
368
  
There is a UNHCR note providing guidance on the standard and burden of proof, which 
determines the balance of probabilities standard to be too burdensome.
369
 The judgment 
further references the UNHCR Handbook paragraphs 196 and 197, which provide guidance 
on when to apply the benefit of the doubt and the strictness of application with regard to 
evidence requirements.
370
 
In Dorcasse, an applicant from the DRC was arrested and issued with a deportation order 
after her asylum application was rejected and her section 22 permit had expired.
371
 The 
applicant has arrived in South Africa in 2006 and issued with a section 22 permit in 2007.
372
 
Her permit was renewed and extended a number of times, and a decision on her application 
was not made until 2009 whereby it was rejected.
373
 The applicant lodged an appeal in 2010 
to the Appeal Board and her permit was continually renewed until a decision was made on 
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the appeal. Upon the applicant’s arrival at the RRO in Pretoria in 2012 to once again renew 
her permit she was arrested on grounds of being an illegal foreigner.
374
 As it transpired, a 
decision had been made on her appeal a year earlier and it had been rejected – however, 
neither the applicant nor her representatives knew of the decision.
375
 
 Two issues are of particular importance in this case. The first is the time taken to provide 
a decision on the original application – the so called ‘temporary’ asylum permit as per section 
22 had to be renewed by the applicant continually from its issue in 2007 to when the original 
decision is made in 2009. The second is the way in which the appeal was conducted by the 
Appeal Board. This is perhaps the most striking error of the two issues highlighted, and the 
judgment emphasises this by determining the applicant’s request for an order for release 
should succeed based on the procedural aspects in the claim and shortcomings in the appeal 
procedure.
376
 
 Not only did the Appeal Board fail to inform the applicant and/or her representative of the 
outcome of the appeal, but the decision was deemed to be ultra vires by Moshidi J as the 
appeal process was not legally constituted according to the law.
377
 Section 13 of the Refugees 
Act requires an appeal to be heard by a ‘chairperson and at least two other members’378 yet 
the decision letter was signed by only one member.
379
 The counter argument put forward by 
the respondents was that section 13 of the Refugees Act had been repealed and replaced by 
section 11 of the Refugees Amendment Act and therefore the appeal was heard by the 
Refugee Appeals Authority rather than the Appeal Board, however the judgment determined 
the new law had not taken effect at that point.
380
 In any case, whether the Appeal Board or the 
Appeals Authority heard the appeal, the composition of the body that heard the appeal in 
Dorcasse was ‘not properly and legally constituted.’381  
 In Tshiyombo, the applicant had also been refused refugee status on grounds of an 
unfounded claim. A subsequent appeal was also refused. The entire process from original 
application to the conclusion of appeals took seven and a half years, which Binns-Ward J 
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described as ‘an inordinate length of time’382 and on the subject of administrative action 
stated that: 
[C]onstitutional principles enjoin administrative efficiency; not as an abstract norm, but for 
the benefit and protection of all of us who are unavoidably affected by various forms of 
administrative action to a greater or lesser degree.
383 
 The judgment also describes the Refugees Act and its administration as being ‘imbued 
with a humanitarian approach’384 and emphasises the adverse effects faced by the applicant 
and his family by the delays experienced in the decision making process, which include 
security and freedoms such as ‘travel documentation, health and education benefits and 
eventual qualification for permanent residence.’385 
5.3.4.4 Rights to a fair hearing 
A number of failures during the hearing process rendered the hearing unfair in Tantoush, 
which contained allegations of bias by the Appeal Board whereby meetings with Interpol 
were not recorded and not presented to the applicant’s legal representatives, thus denying 
them the opportunity to raise any objections. Although the judgment admits that the 
respondent’s approach to Interpol did not constitute bias, it was the ‘shortcomings in conduct’ 
that amounted to a ‘reasonable perception of bias’ that might not have been so had the 
content of the meetings been disclosed to the applicant. The result of not disclosing this 
information meant it could be reasonably argued that the Appeal Board members may not be 
impartial – which is contrary to section 12(3) of the Refugees Act requiring the Appeal Board 
to be independent and free from bias.
386
 Furthermore, the judgment describes the members of 
the Appeal Board as ‘administrators tasked with quasi-judicial functions.’387 
 Section 6(2)(a)(iii) of PAJA gives power to a court to judicially review an administrative 
action if the action was undertaken by an administrator who was biased or reasonably 
suspected of being biased.
388
 The evidence in Tantoush indicated the decision was a result of 
external influence, and the judgment describes this as a ‘procedural irregularity’ that is unable 
to be rectified by an appeal and ‘a total failure of the proper exercise of an independent and 
impartial decision.’389 This was sufficient grounds for setting aside the decision of the RSDO. 
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It also constituted further grounds for review under section 6(2)(e)(iv) of PAJA as the 
decision was made ‘because of the unauthorised or unwarranted dictates of another person or 
body.’390 
 Another example of failure to provide a fair hearing arose in AOL, whereby a failure by 
the Appeal Board to give notice of the hearing meant that the applicant was not able to 
arrange sufficient legal representation.
391
 Section 26(4) of the Refugees Act provides the 
Appeal Board must allow legal representation, therefore implying that notice must be given 
in order for an applicant to arrange the legal representation they are entitled to have.
392
 
5.3.4.5 Other grounds for review 
These include situations where there is lack of jurisdiction or errors of fact,
393
 decisions made 
in bad faith, arbitrarily or capriciously,
394
 decisions made based on irrelevant considerations 
or failure to consider relevant facts,
395
 and unreasonable decisions that no reasonable decision 
maker would have made.
396
 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
In analysing Amit’s findings and the relevant case law, it is clear that South Africa’s refugee 
system is failing to provide sufficient administrative justice to those seeking protection. The 
requirements under PAJA and the Constitution are not met, which in turn means the 
respective international legal obligations are not acknowledged. The need to afford the rights 
to administrative justice is important even to those who do not qualify for refugee status – 
administratively fair decisions apply regardless. For those who do qualify, the need is even 
greater due to the potential for administratively unfair decisions to create potentially life-
threatening situations, particularly in situations where the RSD is negative. It is imperative 
that administrative processes are followed to the letter of the law.  
                                                 
390
 Ibid. 
391
 AOL supra note 329 at 13.  
392
 Ibid. at 13D. 
393
 Lee Ann de la Hunt op cit note 188 at 195. AOL supra note note 329 discussed above is the example provided 
here. It could not be proven that the RSDO was responsible for rejecting this particular application on grounds 
that is was unfounded, and as a result the Appeal Board did not have jurisdiction. 
394
 Ibid. at 196. Adverse decisions made when the applicant refuses to pay a bribe is an example of the ground 
for review in these scenarios, according to section 6(2)(e) and (d) of PAJA respectively. 
395
 Ibid. at 197. The cited example is Deo Gracias Katshingu v The Chairperson of the Standing Committee for 
Refugee Affairs (19726/2010) (WC) unreported decision of 2 November 2011. 
396
 Ibid. The cited examples are Katshingu v Standing Committee for Refugee Affairs (19726/2010) (WC) 
unreported decision of 2 November 2011, 12 lines 10-20; and Katabana v Chairperson for the Standing 
Committee for Refugee Affairs (25061/2011) (WC) unreported decision of 14 December 2012, 25 lines 8-11. 
  
59 
 
 The most notable risk exposed by the identified DHA failings is the violation of the 
principle of non-refoulement. Described as ‘the most vital element of refugeehood’,397 it is 
covered by section 2 of the Refugees Act and Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention. 
Its importance is further emphasised by Article 1(1) of the 1967 Protocol which requires 
states to apply Articles 2 to 34 absolutely and does not allow any reservations to these 
articles. The drafters of the 1951 Refugee Convention made it clear the intention of the non-
refoulement principle was to protect those who fall under the definition of a refugee – 
something which the UNHCR Handbook says can be the case even before a formal decision 
is made on the applicant’s status.398 A refugee status determination is merely a declaration: an 
applicant ‘does not become a refugee because of recognition, but is recognized because he is 
a refugee.’399 
Therefore, insufficient administrative justice poses a significant risk to the protection the 
non-refoulement principle seeks to provide, and failure to apply administrative justice 
procedures can lead to refoulement in all forms: direct, indirect and constructive.
400
 The 
principle highlights the need for administrative justice, and the case law analysis coupled 
with the evaluation of Amit’s work demonstrates the procedural failings that lead to failures 
in applying the law correctly. The failure to apply the law correctly results in a restriction of 
rights, especially those rights provided by international law to which South Africa is a party. 
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Chapter 6 – Conclusion 
The underlying theme of the refugee processing system in South Africa is that there is an 
absence of legal conformity. The law itself is strong, with PAJA giving effect to section 33 of 
the Bill of Rights in the Constitution to place comprehensive administrative justice 
obligations upon public authorities. Internationally, the extensive set of rights are designed to 
protect human rights and human dignity collectively. The Refugees Act 1998 states its 
intention to give effect to international law and although the international law is absent of 
procedural aspects, the extent to which rights are afforded is dependent on comprehensive 
and proper procedure. 
 The system in South Africa is sufficient to provide for the rights obliged by international 
law. Aside from the scarce existence of RROs, the step-by-step process sufficiently 
incorporates international and domestic legal rights encapsulated in the legislation. The 
issuance of temporary permits, the interview process and time limits for processing 
applications can all be considered reasonable in theory, and when compared with equivalent 
legislation in other countries it can be argued that the procedure in South Africa is 
comprehendible. Despite its reasonableness in theory, the reality is that practice has led to it 
being decidedly unreasonable – and it is this that creates the problem.  
Whilst the law in strong, it is only as strong as it is applied to the law. This study has 
identified a number of procedural failings including. There are delays in decisions that go 
beyond the prescribed limits of 180 days by the Refugee Regulations and PAJA that lead to 
temporary permits going on in perpetuity, errors of law leading to restrictions of human rights 
and denials of human dignity. Errors of law also materially affect decisions, particularly 
decisions made surrounding the issue of well-founded fear of persecution. This is a prime 
example of the adverse effect administrative action can have, and highlights the importance 
of offering sufficient administrative justice paths to those individuals directly affected by 
these decisions. In addition, general failures to adhere to the legal procedure can result in 
instances such as an unfair hearing and unfair proceedings – something which PAJA and the 
Constitution seek to protect.  
The importance of sufficient and appropriate administrative justice in refugee law is vital. 
The principle of non-refoulement exists to protect those whose lives are danger due to 
persecution, and aspects of administrative justice such as the requirement to provide written 
reasons for decisions are designed to aid appeal and reviews of decisions. Without written 
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reasons there is an absence of evidence to build a case for appeal or review and that is 
fundamentally unfair. Consider this alongside the fact that genuine refugee applicants are 
seeking protection in a foreign land due to being forced out of their country of origin in fear 
of persecution, and one can understand the need for the procedure to be carried out correctly. 
An applicant should be given the full extent of their rights to have their case heard as it can 
quite simply be a matter a life or death. 
Written reasons are valuable in building a case for appeal, however there are other 
important aspects of administrative justice that are relevant in this scenario. In situations 
where refugees may not know the full extent of their rights or the process generally, of which 
it might be reasonable to assume, then a refused application may be enough for someone to 
think they have exhausted all of their options. This highlights the importance of proper 
practice in ensuring those seeking protection are made aware of their rights. Furthermore, and 
perhaps most importantly, if the law was followed appropriately and applications considered 
competently then it could be argued that rights would be afforded almost automatically. This 
is particularly true in South Africa with the robustness of the Refugees Act. 
The South African problem demonstrates where a lack of administrative justice can cause 
a human rights problem. It is one thing for the law to be sufficient; however this is irrelevant 
if it is not applied correctly.  
6.1 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The overriding purpose of refugee law is to protect. Legal obligations presented by 
international law and subsequently filtered into domestic law provide for this protection. The 
conclusions of this study are that the current refugee application system is not providing the 
protective measures intended by the legal mechanisms. Administrative justice is a vitally 
important component of legal protection that needs to be administered more effectively in the 
South African refugee system. 
The need for more effective administrative justice is demonstrated by Justice Moshidi in 
paragraph 41 of the Dorcasse judgement: 
…[I] need to make mention of one issue which is bothersome. There are numerous similar 
matters involving the Department of Home Affairs on the motion court roll of this High 
Court. This occurs on a weekly basis almost. In my experience, most of these matters ought 
not to be coming to court. In most of the matters the allegations of the applicants are often 
conceded or the matters are simply settled at court. It is not unusual for draft orders in these 
matters to provide for the immediate release of the applicants as well as ancillary relief. It 
may be that the time has arrived for the Department of Home Affairs to devise an effective, 
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cost-saving and well-balanced approach to matters of this nature and immigration issues. 
There is plainly a need to re-visit the preamble to the Refugees Act…401 
This rather telling assessment of the DHA from 2012 emphasises that the issues arising 
from the refugee system in South Africa should simply not be happening. The assertion is 
that the submissions put forward by applicants are often succeeding, which suggests general 
misapplication or misunderstanding of the law by the DHA. 
On this basis, the question of how to increase the effectiveness of administrative is 
answered by increasing competency and understanding the law as well as the intentions of it. 
The preamble of the Refugees Act makes the intentions abundantly clear regarding 
international legal obligations, and PAJA and the Constitution provide for transparent 
interactions between individuals and the state in order to create regulated accountability for 
the actions of that particular institution. Appropriate application of the law will therefore lead 
to effective administrative justice. The case law judgments discussed in this study 
demonstrate the extent of misapplication that from improper procedure practices through to 
the improper composition of authoritative bodies such as the Standing Committee – there 
appears to be no end. 
The DHA could begin by training RSDOs to a sufficient level of competency in order to 
ensure that the earlier stages of the application process are correctly applied. The words of 
Justice Moshidi in Dorcasse call for an ‘effective, cost-saving and well-balanced approach’, 
something which could be achieved by giving RSDOs appropriate resources to carry out 
adequate interviews and assessments of each claim. With adequate training, it is possible to 
ensure RSDs are meeting the requirements of administrative justice provided by all 
appropriate legal mechanisms fulfilled – and providing the required levels of administrative 
justice would result in fewer claims going through lengthy court applications and appeals. 
Inadequate resourcing and lack of facilities are attributed to the DHA by Van Reenan J in 
the 2007 Kiliko judgment. The DHA has attributed its policies and practices to a lack of 
capacity to deal with the number of applications received, yet this is not acceptable as an 
excuse as all reasonable steps must be taken to ensure unconditional compliance with 
constitutional obligations regardless of the adequacy of the resources. Rabie J expresses in 
the Tafira judgement the clear fact that the DHA has insufficient personnel to deal with the 
number of applications being received. Therefore, it is simple to recommend that the DHA 
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should increase the capacity, resources and facilities in a way that it is legally obliged, as 
failing to do so is a violation of its constitutional obligations. 
It is of course easy to merely state the DHA should expand its resourcing, training and 
other general capacities to facilitate proper process of the refugee system when in practice 
such expansion may not be immediately practical. This concession is defeated slightly by the 
fact that the case law demonstrates a continued and sustained period of failure, however in a 
gesture towards a balanced argument it is an important point to make. If is it the case that it is 
impractical or difficult due to the number of applications being received – which have been 
acknowledged to be ‘literally hundreds of thousands’ by Rabie J in Tafira – then group prima 
facie determination as employed by other countries in Africa that have been compelled to 
move from an individual assessment system to a group-based status determination system 
should be considered. 
A closer partnership with the UNHCR would be a valuable move for the DHA to make. 
The Human Rights Committee of the ICCPR acknowledges the problems with access to the 
RSD procedure in its concluding observations of CCPR/C/ZAF/CO/1 of 27 April 2016, in 
particular the ‘inadequate safeguards’ in the process.402 The Committee expresses concerns at 
the obstacles being created by improper practice, and believes it contributes to corruption and 
increased vulnerability of those seeking to use the system. The Committee describes its 
concerns at the ‘increase in difficulties encountered in gaining access’403 which suggests no 
solution to facilitating these difficulties is being implemented. Furthermore, the Committee 
expresses regret that the report on South Africa is ‘14 years overdue.’404 
The concluding observations also recommend: 
[T]he State party should facilitate access to documentation and fair procedures for asylum 
seekers, including translation services and, where the interests of justice so require, access to 
legal representation. It should ensure that asylum applications are processed expeditiously and 
that the principle of non-refoulement is respected under all circumstances.
405 
This recognition by the UNHCR of the problems with the asylum process in South Africa 
demonstrates there is scope for a closer working relationship between South Africa and the 
UN body, especially as the country’s courts have continuously determined there are problems 
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with the application off its refugee law. This argument is further reinforced by the mention of 
the UNHCR Handbook in the case law judgments of Katabana, Tshiyombo, Tantoush and 
Dorcasse – if the courts are using UNHCR guidance in this way, then the DHA would benefit 
from closer consultation in order to address the issues. 
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